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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis analyses the course and nature of Ottoman-German diplomatic and military 
relations before the First World War. It suggests that Germany and the Ottoman Empire 
acted according to their own political interests since their first interaction at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, although their diplomatic relations were mostly 
cordial. Far from being close collaborative partners before the First World War, the 
eventual alliance of the two empires during the war was the natural outcome of each 
empire’s own political and military objectives rather than the outcome of their friendship 
before the war. The thesis also studies the Baghdad Railroad Project, the Russian threat 
against Germany as well as the Ottomans, the German military reform missions to the 
army of the Sultan, and the political situation in the Empire in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.  
 
Keywords: The Ottoman Empire, Germany, Wilhelm II, Abdulhamid II, Ottoman-
German Alliance, Enver Pasha 
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ÖZET 
 
Bu tez Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesindeki Osmanlı-Alman diplomatik ve askeri 
ilişkilerinin seyrini ve karakterini incelemektedir. İncelemenin gösterdiği, Almanya ve 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun diplomatik ilişkilerinin genelde samimi olmasına rağmen iki 
devletin de onsekizinci yüzyılda başlayan ilişkilerinde aslında tamamen kendi politik 
çıkarlarına göre hareket ettiğidir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı öncesinde çok yakın işbirliği 
içinde olmaktan uzak olmakla birlikte, iki imparatorluğun savaştaki ittifakı, savaş öncesi 
yakınlıklarının sonucu olmaktan çok her iki imparatorluğun kendi politik ve askeri 
amaçlarının doğal bir sonucudur. Bu tez bu bağlam içinde, Bağdat Demiryolu Projesi’ni, 
Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na karşı Rus tehdidini, Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’ndaki Alman Askeri Reform Heyetlerini ve imparatorluğun ondokuzuncu 
yüzyılın sonundaki ve yirminci yüzyılın başındaki politik durumunu da incelemektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Almanya, II. Wilhelm, II. 
Abdulhamid, Osmanlı-Alman İttifakı, Enver Paşa 
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
 
At the beginning of 1915 the streets of İstanbul were full of men with Wilhelm-like 
moustaches. Several hundred of them were Germans, but the rest were Ottoman men 
who were following the fashion of day. These men had embedded in their mines 
long-nourished hopes for the survival of the long-lived Ottoman Empire. They 
believed that the Ottomans, with the help of Germany, could defeat the French, the 
British and the Russians. Like the story of the mythical phoenix that reincarnated out 
of its ashes, the Ottoman Empire's final chance of regaining its glorious past 
nourished the dreams of Ottomans, high and low alike. The Empire's alliance with 
the Central Powers gave confidence and hope to Ottomans who believed that 
German military superiority would be instrumental in bringing back the glorious ages 
of the past.  
This thesis analyzes the diplomatic and historical background of the 
Ottoman-German alliance during the First World War. I have tried to discuss and 
analyze the core components of the relationships that developed between the 
Ottoman Empire and Germany before the First World War. The nature of each 
country's attitudes towards the other is evaluated. Study of the consistency or lack of 
consistency of the foreign policy of each nation in relation to the other is an essential 
part of this thesis. It deals with the issues of German military reform missions and 
economic enterprises in the Ottoman Empire as factors both reflecting and shaping 
the relationships. Finally, I have sought to find out to what extent the main 
components of their relations before the First World War influenced their final 
decision to join together to fight the Entente alliance of Britain, Russia and France. I 
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have tried to follow a chronological order while discussing these subjects in the 
historical context of the late Ottoman Empire. At the end of each chapter of the 
thesis, brief analyses of the periods, which the respected chapters cover, are 
provided. 
Chapter I, discusses the first diplomatic interactions between the Ottoman 
Empire and Prussia-later Germany- and the roles of the initial German military 
officers sent to help reform the traditional Ottoman army. The intensification of 
Ottoman-German relations during the reigns of Abdulhamid II and Wilhelm II in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries constitute an important part of the first chapter. The 
negotiations concerning the Baghdad Railroad Project and Kaehler's Military Reform 
Mission are dealt with in the context of contemporary diplomatic developments in 
Europe as well as the Ottoman Empire.  
Chapter II gives a more detailed panorama of the years between the Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Raid on the Sublime Porte in 1913, which led to the 
deposition of Abdulhamid II, and undertaken by the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) under the leadership of Enver Paşa. . The formation of alliances in 
Europe and their repercussions on the Ottoman Empire are analyzed whenever the 
Empire was heavily influenced by the acts of the European Powers. 
In Chapter III, in the wake of an approaching European war, the Ottoman 
Empire's political structure and its efforts to regain power after the Balkan Wars are 
discussed. The arrival of Liman Von Sanders’ Military Mission and the solidification 
of the CUP's grip on Ottoman political power constitute the main subjects that are 
discussed. German views of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman awareness and 
reaction to European diplomatic developments are also discussed. 
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Chapter IV discusses the telegrams exchanged between Berlin and the 
German ambassador in Istanbul in order to show the German attitude towards an 
alliance with the Ottomans. German efforts to lure the Ottomans to ally with them, 
culminating in the secret treaty of August 2, 1914, are given considerable attention as 
well as the war aims of both allies in the context of their uneasy relationship.  
The conclusion summarizes and highlights the important features of the 
German-Ottoman relationship before and during the First World War. I try to find 
whether or not there was a sufficient partnership between the two before the war to 
cause them to enter the war in alliance. 
This thesis covers several aspects of the German-Ottoman partnership. 
Instead of following the traditional way of evaluating the German-Ottoman relations 
in relation to the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the First World War, it is designed to 
understand both countries’ approach to each other until the First World War. In this 
context, German Reelpolitik and the Ottoman lack rational checks and balances 
comprise the most important part of the thesis. The new Ottoman documents are used 
in order to understand Ottoman evaluation of the diplomatic developments in Europe 
and official legitimization about the policy choices of the Empire. The last chapter of 
the thesis covers an extensive use of German Foreign Office documents, which were 
not used by the Turkish historians before. These documents show how German 
attitude about the Ottoman Empire changed within a couple of weeks. They are also 
instrumental in showing that German political and military interests prevailed more 
than anything else.  
In my thesis, I used several primary sources to support my ideas or to help 
form new conclusions. I used documents from the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives 
(Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri) in İstanbul from the sections of Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs (Hariciye Nezareti), Ministry of Internal Affairs (Dahiliye) and the reports 
from the Cabinet (Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları). I also used documents from the 
ATASE Archives (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı 
Arşivi) and the library of the Turkish Historical Association (Türk Tarih Kurumu). 
For the German Foreign Office documents I used the books of Ernest Jackh and 
Ulrich Trumpener, who published or cited the original telegrams of the German 
Foreign Office in their works.  
The documents from the Prime Ministry Archives helped me to understand 
many details, which were not covered in the secondary sources. However, from the 
ATASE documents I could not deduce the views of Enver Paşa or his military 
colleagues, which would be helpful to understand the Ottoman decision to get 
involved in the First World War. Instead, I used the German documents, which gave 
many hints about the final decisions of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire 
before the First World War. This thesis looks at the beginnings of German-Ottoman 
partnership from new perspectives, which can be changed and expanded with 
exploration of new Ottoman documents. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE BEFORE 
 THE REVOLUTION OF 1908 
 
 
A. Political and Military Relations Between Prussia and the Ottoman Empire 
Before The Reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II  
 
The first interaction between Prussia and the Ottoman state occurred in 1701 when 
the Ottomans sent a mission of fifteen people led by Asım Said Efendi to celebrate 
the coronation of Friedrich I as King of Prussia.1 From then on, the relations between 
the two states developed slowly until they both had problems with Russia towards 
the end of the eighteenth century. Prussia helped the Ottomans considerably well in 
the peace negotiations, which ended the Ottoman-Russian war of 1768-1774. Prussia 
and the Ottoman Empire followed this by concluding a defensive alliance in 1790 
when the Ottomans were fighting against both Austria and Russia.2 In consequence, 
Austria-Hungary left the war in 1791, and soon after the Ottomans and Russians 
signed the Treaty of Jassy in 1792.  
Selim III (1789-1808) established permanent embassies in the major 
European capitals in order to lessen the diplomatic isolation of his state. As part of 
this policy, he appointed Giritli Seyyid Ali Efendi as the first Ottoman ambassador to 
                                                 
1 Veli Yılmaz, I. Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Alman İttifakı ve Askeri Yardımlar, (İstanbul: Cem Ofset 
Matbaacılık, 1993), p.19. 
2 This alliance was the first actual alliance signed with a European state. Yılmaz, p. 19-20. 
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Prussia.3 Ottoman ambassadors like Ali Efendi informed the Sultan of the diplomatic 
and military developments of Napoleonic Europe.  
Until the rise to power of Otto von Bismarck during the last quarter of the 
19th century, Prussia's attitude was basically sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire, but 
at the same time it refrained from acting in a manner that would distort what it 
considered more important interests, namely its relations with the other members of 
the Concert of Europe. Prussia did, however, act as a friendly mediator when 
possible, favoring the Ottomans in the negotiations regarding the Near Eastern crisis, 
which led to the Treaty of Edirne, signed in 1829, and also in the peace negotiations 
that followed the Crimean War (1853-1856).  
Throughout the 19th century, the Ottoman Army needed reorganization and 
reform if the state was to maintain a status as a respected power in Europe. Selim III 
began the process at the start of the 19th century by trying to create a new and 
modern Ottoman army as part of his Nizam-ı Cedid (New Order) reforms, for which 
a Prussian officer, Colonel von Goetze provided overall supervision, and other 
Prussian officers joined the Ottoman campaigns against Russia that followed.4 
Selim III's efforts were largely unsuccessful due to many factors, among 
which was resistance by members of the Janissary corps, who sought to retain the old 
order to keep their position in Ottoman society. As a result, in 1826 Mahmud II 
(1808-1839) abolished the Janissary corps entirely, killing many of its members, 
making it far more possible to introduce far more comprehensive reforms in Ottoman 
society as well as the army in the reform movement which came to be known as the 
Reformation (Tanzimat). Once again, Prussia provided the Ottomans with military 
                                                 
3 Yılmaz, p.21, Süleyman Kocabaş, Pancermenizm’in Şarka Doğru Politikası: Tarihte Türkler ve 
Almanlar  (İstanbul: Vatan Yayınları, 1988), p.19. 
4 Jehuda Lotthar Wallach,  Bir Askeri Yardımın Anatomisi: Türkiye’de Prusya-Almanya Askeri 
Heyetleri (1835-1919), (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1985), p. 7. 
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leadership. Captain Helmuth von Moltke of the Prussian General Staff and 
Lieutenant von Berg from the First Special Regiment of Prussia were sent to Istanbul 
in 1835 to lead the reforms. While they were in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan 
asked the government of Prussia to send eleven officers and four non-commissioned 
officers with three-year contracts to train the Ottoman Army (January 1836).5 The 
appointment of the officers was delayed, however, because of government crises in 
Istanbul, Prussian re-evaluation of the initial selections, responsibilities and duties of 
these officers, and von Moltke's reports and recommendations concerning the 
existing situation of the Ottoman Army and officers. Finally, the two states agreed on 
the appointment of only three officers in addition to von Moltke. These were von 
Vincke, Fischer and von Mühlbach who came to Istanbul in August 1837.6 
Von Moltke and the three officers stayed in the Empire until the end of 
Mahmud II's reign in 1839. They did not resemble the previous foreign advisors for 
the Ottoman Army who were mostly adventurers and were retired officers or soldiers 
in their native countries. These Prussian officers were assigned by their state and 
their salaries were paid by Prussia. They did no more than observe the situation of 
the Ottoman army and offer advice, which often was ignored or overlooked by the 
Ottomans. Their services were ended following the Ottoman defeat by Kavalalı 
Mehmet Ali Paşa's armies at Nizip, followed by the death of Sultan Mahmud II in 
1839. The only lasting benefit which the Ottomans got from their services were the 
memoirs of von Moltke, which served as guidelines for all subsequent German 
officers who served in the Ottoman Empire.  
Mahmud II's successors, Abdulmecid (1839-1861) and Abdulaziz (1861-
1876), continued efforts to reform the Ottoman Army, bringing many more Prussian 
                                                 
5 The Prussian King approved the appointment of these officers in June 1836.  
 
6 Wallach, pp. 11-15. 
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officers to train and command. This time, however, they were not officially sent by 
the Prussian State. Instead, they were retired military men who no longer were in 
active service with the Prussian Army. In 1875, the British ambassador to Istanbul 
stated that they numbered no more than a few dozen, a figure which military 
historian Jehuda Wallach estimates to be an exaggeration.7 
These officers helped the Ottomans particularly during the Crimean War of 
1853-1856. The former Prussian artillery officers von Kuczkowski, Schwenzfeuer, 
Wendt, Grunwald, Malinowski and Strecker helped the Ottomans reorganize their 
artillery battalions. The official Prussian (German) Military Committees in the 
Ottoman Empire came only during the time of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908).8 
The start of the Eastern Question9 is said to have been the Treaty of Küçük 
Kaynarca (1774), which gave Russia the ability to influence and stir up the Christian 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire in both Southeastern Europe and Eastern Anatolia. 
The mid-19th century military and political developments, which led to German 
unification, took place at the same time as the Ottoman reform (Tanzimat) 
movement. The threats to Ottoman integrity which developed during the Napoleonic 
wars and as a result of Russian expansion, the Greek independence movement, and 
the uprisings of the Sultan's other Christian subjects in the Balkans, along with the 
threat posed by the independent policies of the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Kavalalı 
Mehmed Ali Paşa led Great Britain to develop a policy of defending Ottoman 
integrity, which in turn greatly increased British influence on internal Ottoman 
policies. When Britain tried to get the Ottomans to substitute British for Prussian 
officers, however, the Ottomans refused. British Foreign Secretary Palmerston feared 
                                                 
7 Nevertheless, these Prussians were mainly military tutors and were not more successful than the 
previous ones. They taught at the military schools established by Mahmud II. 
8 Yılmaz, pp. 35-37, Wallach, pp. 20-23. 
9 Matthew S. Anderson, Doğu Sorunu (1774-1923), (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), p. 387, pp. 
145-8. 
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that this would lessen British ability to influence Ottoman affairs though his military 
advisors reported that Prussia was sending the officers to help the Ottomans due to 
fear of Russian attacks against Prussia as well as the Ottoman Empire.10 For the 
British, Russians were a threat to the European balance of power, especially when 
Russia offered the Ottomans diplomatic and military support during the Egyptian 
crisis in 1838-1839. Ottoman statesmen accepted the Russian offer reluctantly due to 
a quite justified fear that Russia would use its military penetration to expand their 
political influence in the Ottoman court as well as the Christian provinces of the 
Empire.  
The Crimean War (1853-1856) resulted largely from British and French 
efforts to stop the expansion of Russian influence in the Ottoman Empire. With 
strong British and French support, the Ottoman Army was able to push back a 
Russian invasion of northeastern Turkey, though it was unable to prevent the 
Russians from stirring the Armenians resident there to accept Russia as their 
defender and to abandon their loyalty to the Sultan in order to achieve independence. 
The Ottomans were forced to accept loans from Britain and its other allies, which 
helped in the short run but ultimately led to European control of Ottoman finances 
during the last half of the 19th century. In the Peace of Paris (1856), the Ottoman 
Empire was accepted as a European power and its territories were guaranteed by 
other European powers including Prussia. European interference to guarantee 
Ottoman integrity and frustrate Russian ambitions, however, only increased Russian 
grievances against the Ottoman Empire and led to new wars a quarter century later.11 
                                                 
10 Oral Sander, Anka’nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü: Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi Üzerine Bir Deneme, 
(Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1993), p. 177. 
11 Sander, pp. 207-227. 
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Until Bismarck, Prussia did not deal much with the Eastern Question and 
the Ottoman Empire, called the “sick man”12 by the Tsar Nicholas I, except for 
sending some officers and taking part in peace negotiations to protect Ottoman 
integrity and enable the Empire to survive. With Wilhelm I's accession to the throne 
(1888) Bismarck, who was a former member of Prussian parliament, envoy to 
Frankfurt Diet and ambassador to Russia and France, was appointed as Minister-
President, head of the Prussian government. His subsequent policies were aimed at 
uniting the German states under Prussian control and making Germany the strongest 
state in Europe. He worked to achieve these ends by defeating the Austrians, 
isolating the French in European diplomatic affairs, and maintaining peace with 
Russia, ambitions which he had achieved by 1871. Victory against France (1871) 
culminated in his effort to unify the German states under Prussian domination. As a 
result, Germany had become the most powerful industrial nation in Europe after 
Great Britain, with a population of 56 million.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Alan Palmer, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Son 300 Yılı: Bir Çöküşün Yeni Tarihi, (İstanbul: Yeni Yüzyıl 
Yayınları, 1995), p.189, Ernest Jackh, The Rising Crescent: Turkey Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 
(New York: Farrar& Rinehar, Inc., 1944), p. 45. 
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B. Political and Military Relations Between Germany and the Ottoman Empire 
During The Reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II 
 
From 1871 to 1890, Bismarck effectively controlled the new German Empire, while 
at the same time Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) effectively ruled the Ottoman Empire. 
Whereas the brand-new German Empire was an industrialized, strong and coherent 
state; the old Ottoman Empire was becoming an increasingly weakened and 
internally shattered entity, at best concentrating on keeping its territories away from 
several internal and external threats.  
Abdulhamid's reign started with the declaration of the first Ottoman 
Constitution in 1876 and soon after witnessed a devastating war between the 
Ottoman Empire and Russia during 1877-1878. On the other hand, in Western 
Europe, Germany defeated France and Austria as part of its effort to unify. After 
these 'blood and fire' steps, however, Bismarck preferred to spend Germany's energy 
on strengthening its economy and administrative structure, rather than on external 
conflicts, such as those involved in the Eastern Question. He was forced to 
participate, however, by developments beyond his control. Germany and the other 
Great Powers in Western Europe refused to accept the provisions of the Treaty of 
San Stefano (1878), which the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign with Russia that 
gained considerable territorial concessions as well as political domination within the 
Ottoman Empire.  
Russia was unprepared to fight a threatened war with the other Great 
Powers, so it agreed to participate in the Congress of Berlin, which Bismarck 
organized in order to revise those elements of San Stefano that threatened Ottoman 
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integrity and gave Russia a dominant position within the Ottoman Empire. At the 
Congress of Berlin (1878), Bismarck forced the Great Powers to accept revision of 
the Treaty of San Stefano since he feared that to accept it would bring not only 
hostility from Austria-Hungary but also rapprochement between France and England, 
since both hated Russia and feared the danger which its expansion into the Ottoman 
Empire would bring. The final Treaty of Berlin denied Russia most of the territorial 
gains it had achieved at San Stefano, while at the same time compensating Austria-
Hungary with what was promised to be a temporary military occupation and 
administration of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ottomans also 
were forced to allow Great Britain to occupy Ottoman Cyprus in return for Britain’s 
promise to pretext its interest at the Congress. Bismarck thus angered the Russians, 
but he was successful in defending Ottoman integrity while keeping the Balance of 
Power in Europe. 
In the process, however, Great Britain gave up its 19th century policy of 
preventing Ottoman collapse and supporting Ottoman integrity once it saw that the 
Ottoman Empire could no longer act as a buffer state against Russian expansion 
against the British dominions in the East. On the other hand, the substantial military 
and diplomatic defeats inflicted on the Ottomans demonstrated very clearly to Sultan 
Abdulhamid that the Ottoman Empire was weaker than he thought at the start of his 
reign and he could not trust Britain to defend its interests since it had used the 
occasion of the Congress of Berlin to occupy Cyprus, and was clearly intending to 
take over Egypt as well, if for no other reason than to control access to the eastern 
seas and India through the Suez Canal. 
Abdulhamid also felt that he could not trust the other Great Powers either. 
The French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, Russian claims on the Balkans and the 
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Turkish Straits, subsequent Austria-Hungarian efforts to expand their occupation 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina into the western and southern Balkans and the Italian 
claims on Tripoli, made him think about regaining the support of Germany, which 
seemed to be the only Power that did not seem to have ambitions for Ottoman 
territory.13   
Colonialism was not Bismarck’s priority during the early years of his 
domination of German life. In his view, the Eastern Question, “it is not worth the 
good bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer”.14 Before the Berlin Congress, he had 
the idea that Germany had only economic interests and not political interests in the 
Ottoman Empire.15 Successful unification and the development of industrial and 
economic power, however, led to growing German public opinion, and in particular 
the increasingly prosperous industrial and agricultural markets to demand expansion 
into colonial markets, forcing him to work to secure and control parts of southern and 
western Africa, an ambition which, in turn, forced modifications in Bismarck’s 
diplomatic activities following the Congress of Berlin. Although, still far from 
openly intervening in Ottoman affairs, Germany thus began to develop a penetration 
pacifique policy towards the Ottomans. 
Germany began to increase its representation on the Ottoman Public Debt 
Commission (Düyun-u Umumiye), established by Abdulhamid II in 1882 in order to 
enable the Ottomans to pay off foreign loans without bankrupting the Empire. At the 
same time, however, the Ottoman government encouraged new German investments 
in the Ottoman economy, thus increasing the public debt. İlber Ortaylı argues that 
Ottoman public gratitude for German intervention at the Congress of Berlin made the 
                                                 
13 Sevgi Çetinkaya, ‘Osmanlı Devletinin 1. Dünya Savaşına Girişi’, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 
İstanbul University, (1995), p.3. 
14 Ottoman Empire could only be a little figure against the Russians in his eyes. Jackh, p. 126. 
15 Muzaffer Tepekaya, ‘Osmanlı-Alman İlişkileri (1870-1914)’, Türkler (Cilt 13), (Ankara: Yeni 
Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), pp. 41-42. 
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Empire ideologically suitable for further development of German influence.16 Since 
most of the lost territories in Southeastern Europe had substantial Christian 
populations, moreover the Empire had a far more dominant Muslim majority, though 
of several ethnic groups, than had been the case in the past. The idea of Islamic 
nationalism, therefore, coalesced into the ideas of pan-Islamism, and became a 
definite policy option. Germany did not have Muslim colonies and did not support 
national uprisings in the Balkans. On the other hand, France, England and Russia 
ruled substantial Muslim populations in India, Central Asia and North Africa, and at 
the same time were stirring the Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire to revolt 
against Muslim Ottoman rule. In ideological and political terms, moreover, 
Abdulhamid preferred the authoritarian German regime to the English constitutional 
regime and French republican regime.17 
Abdulhamid was more of a reformer than a reactionary. Although, he did 
not want any opposition to his authority, he was compelled to make radical reforms 
in the military, police, and judicial and administrative organizations in order to 
strengthen the Empire sufficiently for it to resist further territorial and political 
losses. The success of the German army against the French army in 1871, moreover, 
fascinated him. This fascination was strengthened by German assistance at the 
Congress of Berlin. In 1887, when Bismarck concluded the “Dreikaiserbund (Three 
Emperors League)” between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, Abdulhamid 
felt Germany would have benefited far more by expanding its influence as far as the 
Persian Gulf, instead of acquiring even more of what he felt to be needless colonies. 
It is apparent that although he was cautious about the idea, Abdulhamid was in favor 
of a possible Ottoman-German partnership in economic as well as military matters. 
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After 1880, therefore, he started an intensive effort to bring German military and 
civilian officers to the Empire in order to direct the reforms, which he was 
introducing to the Ottoman Army. 
Bismarck was reluctant to diffuse German energies and power by 
intervening actively in Ottoman affairs, but he was persuaded by German 
ambassador Count Hatzfeld, who felt that an Ottoman partnership would be 
advantageous for Germany and recommended that the Ottoman request for German 
officers would enable Germany to counter possible Russian efforts to expand their 
influence into the Ottoman Empire.18 In response to this recommendation, on April 
11, 1882,19 the Kaiser, Wilhelm II approved the assignment of four German military 
officers to the Ottoman Empire.20 The officers were Colonel Kaehler (Head of 
Commission), Captain Kamphönever, Captain von Höbe and Captain Ristow. 
Abdulhamid subsequently requested additional officers to help the reorganization 
military education and training. This request was also accepted, and on June 18, 
1883, Major Baron Colmar von der Goltz was assigned to the task, beginning a 
career in the Ottoman military, which would last, with some breaks, until his death in 
Mesopotamia during the First World War.21  
In order to meet the inevitable reactions from Russia and Britain against the 
resulting increase of German influence in Ottoman affairs, the newly-appointed 
German officers were accepted as regular Ottoman officers, but their salaries, paid in 
very high amounts, came from the treasury of the Public Debt Commission (Düyun-u 
Umumiye), thus under the control of the European bankers who dominated that body. 
In the meantime, Kaehler was promoted to the rank of Turkish lieutenant general as 
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well as aide-de-camp (yaver-i ekrem) to the Sultan. The other German officers were 
given similar appointments, thus starting a new policy of officers serving in a foreign 
army without cutting their ties with their own army. They agreed to enter Ottoman 
service since they could not have achieved such important posts so quickly in their 
own country. They felt, however, that both as Germans and Christians, they were 
superior to their Ottoman colleagues. This led them to ignore Ottoman traditions and 
rules whenever they wished, causing considerable friction with the Ottomans as time 
went on. Their primary duties were to prepare reports on the organization and the 
situation of the Ottoman Army and to advise on needed reforms and reorganization. 
The long and detailed reports which they prepared, however, were accepted but not 
actually put into effect for some time, because although Abdulhamid wanted to 
modernize his army, his long-standing paranoia caused him to fear the possibility 
that a reorganized and strengthened army might well act against him and his 
policies.22 Kaehler’s group of German officers thus had little effect on Ottoman 
military development. 
In June 1883, Major von der Goltz was assigned to the service of the 
Ottoman Army as Head of the Inspectorate of Military Schools with the rank of Staff 
Lieutenant Colonel and made considerable contribution in training young Ottoman 
officers. In 1886, the Sultan promoted him to the rank of Vice-Head of General Staff 
while he continued to advise in modernizing Ottoman military schools.23 Von der 
Goltz also helped improve the Ottoman Navy and of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus 
Straits fortifications. He even worked on the committee that supervised the 
construction and improvement of Ottoman military train stations. 
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Von der Goltz’s first term of service in the Ottoman Empire ended in 1895. 
Wallach states that during his twelve years of service, Von der Goltz published 
several books and pamphlets, and he was the only German reformer who directly 
contacted the German embassy and the German military headquarters about the 
situation of the Ottoman army.24 Goltz was a typical successful example of a German 
officer whose passion and ambition had been hindered in Germany. He was an 
active, hard-working and clever political intelligence officer as well as military 
expert, but whose passion and ambition had been hindered in Germany. He was the 
only German officer who influenced the Ottoman generals and knew the Ottoman 
army best.25 He was, moreover, extremely influential in getting the Ottoman 
government to purchase German rather than British arms, thus enabling the 
important German firms of Mauser, Krupp and Loewe to profit enormously from 
their sales to the Ottoman army.26 
Von der Goltz had in fact undertaken and accomplished so much during his 
years in the Ottoman Empire that after his return to Germany, the German 
government had to appoint several military and naval attachés in the Ottoman 
Empire in order to fill the gap left by his departure. After his departure, several 
German military attachés began to serve effectively in the Ottoman Empire. Among 
them Von Morgen, Von Strempel, Von Leipzig, Von Lossow and Humann were the 
most important. They reported directly to the German Emperor of the important 
developments in Turkey. They were very effective at influencing the Ottomans to 
continue their arms purchases from Germany. At the same time, they established 
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connections with the important figures of the Young Turk movement after the 
Revolution of 1908, particularly with the man who later became the Minister of War 
and dominated the Ottoman government, Enver Paşa. They also worked hard for the 
economic interests of Germany leading to the award of Baghdad Railway 
concession.27 
The most successful German military attaché in Ottoman service following 
von der Goltz’s departure was Major Kurt Morgen, who served between 1897 and 
1901. Erich von Leipzig served for six years. Walter von Strempel also was an 
influential figure starting in 1907 until the military commission led by Liman von 
Sanders came to the Ottoman Empire in 1914.28 
In 1898, there were only three official German military reformers left in the 
Ottoman Empire: Marshall Kamphönever, and the generals von Grumbckow and von 
Hofe. Kurt Morgen demanded from his government the dispatch of qualified military 
officers. In 1899, Captains von Mesmer-Saldern and von Rüdgisch were sent to 
Turkey. In 1901, they were joined by  majors Von Difurth, Imhoff and Auler.29 
These officers took part in the “Commission of Fortifications”, which was 
designed to strengthen the fortifications of the Straits and İstanbul. In 1907, General 
Ditfurth proposed the establishment of the “Model Battalions (Numune Taburları)”, 
in which nine-month theoretical and applied courses were followed. Reports made at 
the start of the third term in March 1908 stated that these battalions were having 
good results. However, the salaries of the German officers, which were three times 
the salaries of Ottoman officers in similar positions, caused considerable discontent 
among the latter. In addition, the older generals were uncomfortable with the 
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unfamiliar reforms that were being applied. As a result, following the Young Turk 
Revolution in 1908-1909, most of the Ottoman press began to advocate that the 
German officers be dismissed.30 
During Abdulhamid II’s reign, the German officers also served in the 
Ottoman Navy. After serving several years, Captain Starcke returned to Germany in 
1891. In his place, Lieutenant Commander Kalau von Hofe was assigned in 1892. 
Despite a few quarrels with the Minister of Navy, Hasan Paşa, he carried out useful 
service during his years in the Ottoman Empire.31 
During most of the 19th century, it was Great Britain that protected the 
Ottoman Empire, albeit for its own purposes, fearing that otherwise Russia and 
France would dominate the lines of communication through the Middle East to India. 
Britain, however, preferred the Ottoman Empire to be weak so that it could control it 
or at least influence its policies. But the replacement of Benjamin Disraeli’s 
Conservative government with the Liberals of William Gladstone marked a 
significant change in British policy, away from supporting Ottoman integrity to one 
of supporting the nationalist ambitions of the minorities of the Ottoman Empire, even 
though this could well increase Russian influence in the area.  
Ottoman suspicions of changing British policies and intentions were 
stimulated originally by Britain’s insistence on occupying Cyprus in return for its 
role defending the Ottomans at the Congress of Berlin. Subsequent British 
occupation of Ottoman Egypt (1882) confirmed these fears and caused the Ottomans 
think about a new protector.32 
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Kaiser Wilhelm II’s accession to the German throne in 1888 opened a new 
era in Ottoman-German relations as he began to spread German in place of British 
influence throughout the Middle East. The new energetic and ambitious German 
Emperor did not accept Bismarck’s conservative foreign policy and concentration on 
internal development. Bismarck had advocated the policy of preserving the peace in 
the Continental Europe. He wanted alliances with both Austria-Hungary and Russia. 
Wilhelm II, however, advocated an aggressive foreign policy that aimed at finding 
new resources and markets for the developing German industry. He believed that 
Germany should only ally with Austria-Hungary on the continent of Europe. In 1890, 
therefore, he refused Bismarck’s desire to renew the non-aggression pact with Russia 
that had supported the latter’s efforts to expand its influence in the Balkan states.33 
This in turn, alienated Russia from Germany and forced it toward a rapprochement 
with France, and later with England in what became the Triple Entente. Bismarck’s 
subsequent resignation left Wilhelm II as the dominating force in determining 
German foreign policy, and enabled him to begin a new “Weltpolitik (World 
Policy)” approach to Germany’s relations with the rest of the world.34 
The second turning point was the appointment of Prince Bernhardt von 
Bülow as the new foreign minister and Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz as the new 
Chief of Navy in 1897. By this time Wilhelm II also consolidated his rule and 
Weltpolitik began to be functional. For Weltpolitik to be successful, the German 
Navy, which ranked only the sixth in the world at the time, had to be strengthened at 
least to the point of equality, and if possible supremacy in relation to the British 
Navy, which had ruled the seas for the two previous centuries. Following the German 
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Parliament’s (Reichstag) acceptance of a new naval law, Germany began an 
intensive shipbuilding program that made its navy the second in the world by the 
start of the First World War.35 Naval development enabled Germany, in turn, to 
extend its colonial possessions. Germany’s role in the Transvaal rebellion (1900) and 
the Moroccan crises (1905, 1906) showed that Germany was becoming a first class 
power that could not be ignored. 
Weltpolitik’s reflection in the Ottoman Empire could be seen in several 
areas. As Germany participated in the colonial race very late, there were not many 
territories left in the world to be colonized. Therefore, Germany turned to the 
traditional empires of Persia, China and the Ottoman Empire. Persia and China were 
already divided into spheres of influence, living little room for German expansion. It 
was relatively easy, however, for the Germans to penetrate into the Ottoman Empire 
where the other Great Powers were seen as devoted entirely to their own financial 
benefit.36 Count von Hatzfeld37 persuaded Wilhelm II that the Ottoman Empire was 
most suitable for German economic penetration. According to his view, France had 
been the most favored country in the Empire until Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 
1798. Afterwards, Britain had replaced France because of its assistance in driving the 
French armies out of Egypt. However, now, in view of the changes taking place in 
British policies, the Ottomans were seeking a new protector, giving Germany an 
opportunity to fill the gap. Wilhelm II was convinced, so Germany began to follow a 
friendly policy towards the Ottoman Empire, trying to benefit from Ottoman 
resources by peaceful means.38  
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While Wilhelm II’s Germany was pursuing an aggressive foreign policy, 
Abdulhamid was very cautious about the future of his old empire. He faced many 
opponents and threats to his authoritarian regime because of his efforts to modernize 
the Ottoman state and society, and he wanted to achieve his goals without 
threatening the Empire’s territorial integrity. The first Young Turk committee was 
established in 1889. Most of the leaders were arrested and exiled in 1895, but the 
Armenian revolts and large-scale Armenian terrorism caused even more trouble since 
it developed with the encouragement and support of Russia and, to a lesser extent, 
Britain. The problems, however, remained, and Christian uprisings and massacres of 
Turks in Crete and Macedonia kept the Sultan busy during the remaining years of his 
reign. Finally, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, including the declaration of the 
Second Constitutional Regime meant the end of Abdulhamid’s political domination 
and left the Empire for the most part dominated by the Committee of Union and 
Progress through the years that remained until the end of the First World War. 
On the whole, Abdulhamid was successful in consolidating his power 
despite the many threats to himself and his reign. In the midst of the political turmoil 
in the Ottoman Empire in the 1890s and the early 1900s, and lacking both political 
and military power, he was successful by balancing off the conflicting interests both 
within and outside the Empire. He was well aware of the conflict of interests between 
the Great Powers, and successfully played them against each other. Typical of his 
methods was the manner in which he granted concessions in the Baghdad Railway 
Project. 
The Baghdad Railway was not an original project developed by the 
Germans.39 The other great powers had also been considering the benefits of 
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extending the Anatolian Railroads to the southern end of Iraq. For the Germans, it 
was a part of the penetration pacifique plan, which had been advocated and 
supported since the 1870s by the German orientalists who hoped to dominate the 
Arab portions of the Empire by colonizing them. Germany also worked to take over 
the Baghdad Railway Project as a means of counteracting French and British 
economic and political expansion elsewhere in the Middle East. 
When Abdulhamid was convinced that Turkey should stop its dependency 
on British diplomacy before it was too late, Germany presented itself as a good 
option. Although far from being allied to Germany, the Ottoman Empire under the 
Sultan’s leadership used German economic interests as a political and diplomatic tool 
against Britain and France. In 1888, with the initiatives of Alfred Kaulla and Georg 
von Siemens, a German syndicate had obtained a concession to build a railway from 
İzmit to Ankara. In 1889, The Anatolian Railway Company (Societe du Chemin de 
Fer Ottoman d’Anatolie) was established, with Otto von Kühlmann, a leading 
official of the German Foreign Office, as its director. This was followed almost 
immediately by Kaiser Wilhelm II’s first visit to the Ottoman Empire, culminating in 
the signature of the Turkish-German Trade Agreement on August 28, 1890.40 
The 1888 concession marked the beginning of German economic 
influence. Naturally the German government favored these developments, 
which received powerful backing from the able ambassador sent to 
Istanbul in 1897, Baron Marschall von Biberstein. Within a few years he 
had acquired a dominant situation in the Turkish capital, while the 
efficiency of German promoters, bankers, traders, engineers, 
manufacturers, ship-owners and railway builders soon undermined French 
and British interests and created something like a German economic 
empire in the Near East.41 
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In 1893, the Germans completed the railway running from İzmit to Ankara. This led 
Abdulhamid to grant the Germans the right to construct a commercial port and 
railroad station in Haydarpaşa, on the shores of the Gulf of İzmit across the Sea of 
Marmara from İstanbul, and the concession in principle of the right to extend their 
railway from Konya to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf in 1899, a grant which was 
made official in 1903. Wilhelm II tried hard to get these concessions for his subjects. 
He visited the Ottoman Empire second time in 1899. During his visit, he traveled to 
the Arab provinces of the Empire, and in Damascus he declared that he was the 
friend and protector of 300 million Muslims in the world. 
The construction of railways was of major importance to the Ottoman 
Empire. They would bring prosperity to its backward districts and at the same time 
enable the government to move troops more rapidly to defend the frontiers or deal 
with internal revolts. The economic and diplomatic support of a distant and 
disinterested Germany was therefore preferable for such projects to the imperialist 
minded empires of Britain and France. For Germany, the Baghdad railway would 
connect Berlin to Istanbul and it would block Russia’s possible line of expansion to 
the Mediterranean through the Balkans.  Russia did not want the Ottomans to prosper 
and regain their power since this would make it far more difficult for it to gain 
control of the Straits and thus secure free access to the open sea. The Berlin-Baghdad 
axis was also seen as a menace to British imperial interests in Egypt, Iran and India42 
as well as to French interests in Syria and Levant.  
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Germany realized that development of the Anatolian railroad without the 
support of its European neighbors would not only force it to invest an inordinate 
amount of money, but also would lead to constant European opposition to all 
German economic and political plans elsewhere in the world. The Deutsche Bank, 
therefore, tried to interest British, French, and Russian investors to join the project, 
but only with minority status. Instead, in 1900, Russia forced Turkey to accept the 
Black Sea Agreement, which dictated that only Russian citizens should be granted 
railway concessions in Northern Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia. The British and 
French governments also refused to join in the project so long as it was dominated by 
Germany. As a result, the Germans began the construction of the first section of the 
railway in 1904 without the financial aid or political support of any other foreign 
government, imposing new strains on Germany and the Ottoman Empire’s relations 
with all the major European powers.43 This situation accelerated the rivalry of 
Germany and Great Britain on the international level, and was a major reason that 
Britain concluded an alliance with France in 1904, and Russia in 1907, thus forming 
the Triple Entente, starting the series of events that culminated in the outbreak of the 
First World War. 
The Baghdad Railroad Project was one of the most important elements of 
the German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire. Throughout Abdulhamid’s 
reign, German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire increased substantially. 
Between 1890 and 1910, Germany’s share in Turkey’s trade volume increased from 
6 per cent to 21 percent. Ottoman exports to Germany rose from a value of 766,000 
to 3,203,000 pounds sterling during the same years. German exports to the Ottoman 
Empire rose from 1,970,000 in 1890 to 5,778,000 pounds in 1910. The holdings of 
                                                 
43 Bury, p.116 
 26 
Germany in Ottoman debt increased from 7.5 to 15 percent between 1881 and 1898. 
And while France accounted for 25.9 per cent and Britain for 16.9 per cent of the 
foreign money invested in Turkish enterprise, Germany alone reached 45.4 per 
cent.44 Although it was still not dominant, Germany became one of the biggest 
powers shaping the Ottoman economy throughout Hamidian times. 
In the diplomatic arena, Abdulhamid’s policy was to secure German support 
without allying with it in order to avoid major diplomatic problems with Britain and 
to keep Russia neutral. Germany, however, was not content with Abdulhamid’s 
neutrality and balance politics. It wanted a more substantial commitment of 
cooperation and support from the Sultan. As the two great diplomatic blocs were in 
the process of formation at the start of the 20th century, therefore, Germany tried to 
lure the Ottoman Empire into its alliance with Austria-Hungary. Just at this time, the 
Committee of Union and Progress was becoming a major threat to the Sultan’s 
regime. So, Germany did not want to alienate them in case they managed to replace 
the Sultan with their own regime. Germany, therefore, covertly joined Britain and 
France in supporting the CUP, which in 1898 encouraged Wilhelm II to help bring 
Murad V to the Ottoman throne.45 
Germany continued to assist the Ottoman Empire in international issues and 
crises. In 1895, Lord Salisbury became the new British Prime Minister, but he 
continued the policy of abandoning the traditional British policy of defending 
Ottoman integrity in order to prevent the Middle East from falling under Russian 
control. Just at this time, Russian stimulus and encouragement led to the outbreak of 
a major Armenian revolt and the spread of Armenian terrorism throughout the 
Empire. In reaction, Salisbury told the German Ambassador in London, Hatzfeld that 
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even if the Ottoman Empire solved that Armenian issue, it could not survive much 
longer, and proposed partition of the Empire between Britain and Germany in order 
to keep the Russians out, an idea which Germany rejected, preferring to keep the 
Ottoman Empire intact, though under its own political and economic domination.46 
In response to the Armenian Revolt, the Great Powers, in particular Great 
Britain and Russia, advocated the introduction of widespread reforms in Eastern 
Anatolia. Abdulhamid believed that any reform unique to the provinces where the 
Armenians were revolting would result in the segregation of those provinces from 
the rest of the Empire, and anger the Empire's Muslim majority unless the latter 
received the same benefits. He believed that Britain was planning to establish an 
Armenian state in the east under British control in order to prevent Russia from 
expanding through the Middle East and to balance the German sphere of influence in 
Anatolia that would be created by construction of the Baghdad railroad. An 
autonomous Armenia would constitute a buffer zone against Russian expansion 
through Anatolia toward the Mediterranean. Germany did not give a full support to 
Abdulhamid on the Armenian question, but it did not position itself on either the 
Russian or the British side due to the fear of upsetting its relations with them 
elsewhere in Europe. 
Another domestic problem that had international repercussions was the 
Macedonian Question. Macedonia was an arena in which the newly-independent 
states of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria claimed overlapping territories, where various 
ethnicities, religions and nationalities were intermixed under the umbrella of 
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Ottoman control, each attempting to secure control of the entire area with the help 
and support of Russia as well as one or another of the Balkan states. In response, the 
Great Powers of Europe demanded reforms in the areas of Macedonia inhabited by 
Christians, more or less on the model of the reforms being demanded for the 
Armenian areas of Eastern Anatolia, in the process using their insistence on 
supervising the reforms, while supporting nationalist agitation and terrorism, in order 
to develop their own political and economic presence in the area. Abdulhamid II 
responded to these demands in 1903 by establishing a new Inspector-Governorship 
(Rumeli Umum Müfettişliği) for Macedonia in a special province called East 
Rumelia. Each Balkan state, however, and each Great Power followed its own 
agenda for its own purposes, stimulating each national group to demand control over 
the entire area, with contradicting claims resulting in increasing terrorism and 
anarchy in the early years of the twentieth century. 
Whenever Abdulhamid II tried to send in troops to curb the terrorism, 
Europe’s politicians and press accused him of massacring Christians, so little in fact 
was done and the violence continued. The turmoil in Macedonia contributed to the 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908, when the young Ottoman officers in Macedonia 
who were leading the troops to fight against the Bulgarian and Greek bandits reacted 
to Abdülhamid II's continued surrender to European pressure by failing to send them 
sufficient arms and men to put down the terrorism by revolting against his autocratic 
rule, and a year later deposing him in favor of Sultan Mehmed V Reşad, who became 
little more than a puppet in their hands. On the Macedonian question, Germany had a 
pro-Austrian policy that wanted to limit Serbia and Bulgaria's expansionist policies 
and expand the influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire since it was a potential 
ally of Germany. When Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in reaction 
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to the Young Turk revolt, its support by Germany created substantial questions in 
Ottoman minds about the extent of German support for Ottoman integrity. 
Germany did not join the other European powers in supporting the Greek 
uprisings in Crete during the 1890s. Wilhelm II had dynastic ties with the King of 
Greece, as he had with most of the other crowned heads of Europe, but he did not 
support the Greeks because of the fear that their success would help Russia most of 
all. Greece was finally forced to withdraw its soldiers from Crete as a result of 
international pressure, but it simply sent them to East Rumelia, where they joined the 
local Greek terror bands in attacking Muslims as well as the other Balkan Christian 
groups that had claims on the area. This led to a war in which the Ottomans defeated 
the Greeks (1897). This, in turn, caused the Greeks to revolt again in Crete, with 
substantial assistance from the Greek mainland. This time, France, Russia, England 
and Italy landed soldiers and took control of the island. For all practical purposes, 
therefore, it was the de facto end of the Ottoman sovereignty on the island. After the 
1908 Revolution, the Cretan Parliament declared Crete’s unification with Greece, but 
its effort was not fulfilled until1912.47  
Domestically, Abdulhamid's main enemies were the Young Turks who 
wanted to depose him and establish a Constitutional regime, though under their 
domination. These Young Turks were mostly the generation of people who studied 
abroad or studied in the new schools, which had been opened by the sultan. 
Abdulhamid’s major weakness was his failure to instill loyalty in the new 
generations of bureaucrats and officers, the Ottoman intelligentsia, which 
was being produced by his own expanded educational institutions. While 
it could be argued that his government succeeded remarkably well in 
keeping the remains of the empire intact, it completely failed to provide 
inspiration and a sense of direction to its own servants.48 
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The students of schools like the Civil Service Academy (Mülkiye) and War 
Academy (Harbiye) were attracted to liberal and constitutional ideas. The first 
Young Turk society was established in the Military Medical College (Tıbbiye) in 
1899, later transforming itself into the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The 
Committee was put under considerable pressure by the Sultan's government, but the 
establishment of the Ottoman Freedom Society (Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti) and the 
union of the two groups (1907) made the committee a powerful and influential 
organization. The Macedonian problem and the Reval Agreement between Russia 
and England (1908), which proposed to resolve the Macedonian problem by turning 
it over to foreign control, while leaving the Sultan with only formal suzerainty, were 
the direct causes of the Young Turk Revolution which took place in July 1908. 
“When news of the Reval Agreement reached Salonica, accompanied by rumors that 
Britain and Russia had agreed to partition the Ottoman Empire, the CUP decided to 
act. The timing of its actions was probably also influenced by the discovery that 
government agents were on the verge of uncovering parts of the organization.”49 The 
CUP therefore incited a full-scale revolt in Macedonia and when the sultan saw he 
could not stop them, he gave in and on the night of 23 July 1908 restored the 
Ottoman Constitution after an interval of thirty years. 
To sum up, the main factors that directed German-Ottoman relations before 
the First World War were economic and geopolitical. By the granting of economic 
concessions, the Ottoman government tried to attract Germany to its side, and in 
opposition to Russian ambitions, in the wars and international crises that were taking 
place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Abdülhamid II hoped that 
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allowing German economic penetration into his Empire would prevent Russia from 
achieving its ambitions in the Balkans, the Straits and Eastern Anatolia. On the other 
hand, when Britain joined those who wanted to partition the Ottoman Empire after 
the Congress of Berlin, Germany replaced Britain as the new diplomatic protector. 
Abdulhamid's policy that alleviated the ambitions of France, Russia and Great 
Britain by using Germany worked well. Basically he applied the policy of divide and 
conquer on the Great Powers, with considerable success. Germany became a serious 
rival of those Great Powers in the Ottoman Empire, and this, in turn, created more 
sophisticated power struggle in the Eastern Question. When Abdülhamid requested 
German military officers and trainers from Wilhelm II, relations between Germany 
and the Ottoman Empire improved further.50 To what extent this military help 
profited the Ottomans is debatable, but it certainly benefited German economic 
enterprises such as Krupp and Mauser, and bolstered German economic penetration 
in the Ottoman Empire. Before the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the Ottoman army's 
equipment was modernized, but full-scale efforts were not made to reform the army 
structure, its officer corps and chain of command. German military, economic, and 
diplomatic dealings in the Ottoman Empire surely gave a new dynamism to the 
Ottomans. Although Abdulhamid had reformist domestic policies, he never wanted 
to risk the status quo of the empire by becoming an official ally of Germany since 
this would alienate Britain and France and leave Germany in control. He never let 
Germany have a say in defense policy.51 German military officers were never 
allowed to initiate drastic changes in the Ottoman army since Abdulhamid felt that a 
powerful army most certainly would constitute a major menace to his autocratic 
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regime. Whether Abdulhamid prolonged or shortened the life of his empire by 
developing relations with Germany is a difficult question to answer, since the 
German military assistance was in fact more political and economic than it was 
military. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF 1908 
 
 
A. Domestic Affairs  
 
The CUP had to persuade the people in Istanbul and Anatolia that the restoration of 
the 1876 constitution was its own work and not that of the Sultan. Starting with the 
arrival of the CUP leaders in Istanbul, though for the most part they concealed their 
membership and identities, they tried to establish themselves in the public mind as 
the real architects of the revolution and the resulting Constitutionalism. They also 
began to think of what to do with the government. For the moment, they left the 
government in the hands of the incumbent Grand Vizier, Said Paşa and did not 
depose the Sultan.52 Said Paşa, however, was not so willing to continue as Prime 
Minister because the turmoil in İstanbul made it difficult for him to exercise full 
authority. Additionally, when the imperial edict of Abdulhamid II concerning his 
dedication to the constitutional regime specified that he would directly appoint the 
ministers of War and Navy, the CUP objected, demanding that the Grand Vizier 
choose these ministers, though Said Paşa supported the Sultan’s position. A group of 
CUP leaders came to İstanbul from Salonica to discuss the issue with the Sultan and 
the Grand Vizier, but the only result was that Said Paşa was compelled to resign on 
                                                 
52 The reasons for leaving them in their posts were: The sultan was good at manipulating public 
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eyes. “Age and seniority were very important preconditions for authority in Ottoman society and the 
Young Turks”. Zürcher, p.98. 
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August 5, 1908 while his bitter rival during the Abdulhamid II years, Kıbrıslı Kamil 
Paşa, was appointed in his stead.53  
Kamil Paşa favored Great Britain rather than Germany, but he shared Said 
Paşa's view that the country was not ready for a fully constitutional regime. He also 
did not sympathize with the CUP, and included none of its members in the cabinet.54 
He was willing, however, to compromise with the CUP on political matters. His task 
was not an easy one. For the most part, the Ottoman people perceived freedom to be 
lawlessness. It was therefore incumbent on him to first end the social turmoil caused 
by the revolution before he could make real changes in the manner in which the 
Empire was governed. The Young Turk Revolution led workers to demand wage 
increases, resulting in over one hundred strikes in the six months following the 
revolution. In response to this situation, the Cabinet decided to hold early elections. 
The election campaign and the elections themselves resolved the political 
situation. The results showed the CUP's dominance in the parliament although most 
of its members refused to reveal themselves as such though they supported those 
candidates that advocated its political programs and who accepted the leadership of 
its Unionist (İttihad ve Terakki) party. The opposition Party of Ottoman Liberals 
(Ahrar Fırkası) managed to win only one seat in the parliament. Although the CUP 
believed that Kamil Paşa supported the Liberals rather than the Unionists, the CUP 
leaders did not overthrow him, but instead continued to dominate the government 
indirectly while refusing to reveal their CUP connections. Only after a series of 
conflicts between the Grand Vizier and the Unionists in parliament did they finally 
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54 The cabinet members were all former ministers or officers of the pre-constitution Hamidian regime. 
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replace him in February 1909 with an openly Unionist Grand Vizier, Hüseyin Hilmi 
Paşa.55 
Neither the Ottoman liberals nor the conservative religious circles liked the 
CUP’s actions. Supported by the British and French, the Party of Ottoman Liberals 
joined the religious extremists in carrying out demonstrations and spreading 
propaganda against the new regime. On 12 April 1909,56 the imperial guards from 
the Taşkışla barracks in İstanbul marched to the Parliament with religious teachers 
and students, demanding changes to the cabinet, restoration of the Muslim Holy Law 
(şeriat) and amnesty for the rebellious troops. Under this pressure, Hüseyin Hilmi 
Paşa resigned from his office the next day with the approval of the sultan, while 
Tevfik Paşa was appointed in his place. In the meantime, the rebels assassinated a 
number of well-known Unionists in the capital and drove most of the other members 
out of İstanbul and back to Macedonia. The Liberal Party (Ahrar) thus failed in its 
efforts to keep the insurrection “a purely anti-CUP affair and to prevent it from 
moving into a reactionary, anti-constitutionalist and pro-Abdulhamid direction.”57 
Confronted with a real threat to the constitutional regime, the CUP 
organized an “Army of Deliverance (Action Army)”58 in Macedonia led by Mahmud 
Şevket Paşa in order to suppress the insurrection. On April 24, the Action Army 
moved from Salonica to İstanbul by train, occupied the city, arrested and executed a 
large number of the rebels. Three days later, the CUP deposed Abdulhamid II and 
replaced him with Mehmed V. “The new sultan, Mehmed Reşad, was at the mercy of 
the Committee, who made a clean sweep of the palace and put their own nominees 
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into key positions there. From now on, the Committee of Union and Progress became 
the real masters of Turkey.”59 
Since the Action Army suppressed the reactionary rebellion, the army held 
all power in its hands. Some articles of the constitution were changed.60 The cabinet 
led by Hakkı Paşa replaced the one led by Hilmi Paşa in December 1909. Radical 
reforms were applied both to the bureaucracy and the officer corps, leading to early 
retirements and salary reductions.61 The commander-in-chief, Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 
urged military officers not to get involved in politics. Despite oppositions to its 
domination both in the army, and by the newly formed opposition parties,62 the CUP 
central committee managed to handle the affairs reasonably well from behind the 
scenes until the Italians invaded Tripoli (Trablusgarb), beginning the Tripolitan War 
(1911-1912) and revolts which began in Yemen and Albania made it difficult for it to 
control the situation. The grand vizier, Hakkı Paşa resigned and was succeeded by 
Said Paşa, who had served in that position during Abdulhamid II’s reign. In reaction, 
most of the Ottoman opposition parties united to form the Party of Freedom and 
Entente (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası), which constituted the first real threat to CUP’s 
domination. Therefore, in the elections of 191263 the CUP tried and succeeded in 
preventing them from becoming dominant in the parliament and succeeded in this 
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aim. The new government headed by Said Paşa gained a vote of confidence, but he 
resigned, as he did not trust the parliament.64 
A new cabinet was formed after Mahmud Şevket Paşa resigned from his 
office. The new cabinet, known as the Great Cabinet65, headed by Gazi Ahmed 
Muhtar Paşa, denounced the interference of the army officers in politics and saw the 
CUP as responsible for the political chaos in the Empire. In order to suppress CUP’s 
influence in the parliament, the cabinet dissolved the CUP-dominated parliament by 
adjourning, in agreement with the anti-CUP leaders in the army, the Saviour Officers 
(Halaskar Zabitan).66 They lifted the martial law put into force during the counter-
revolution of April 1909 and began to persecute the leading CUP members.  
At the end of October 1912, Kamil Paşa became the new grand vizier. He 
was glad to continue the ousting of the Unionists, but the beginning of the Balkan 
Wars rendered his government weak and incompetent. When the government 
accepted the Great Powers’ proposal of handing over Edirne after the disastrous 
defeats of the Ottoman Army by the Balkan states, the insecure CUP leaders found 
their justification to grasp power and took action. They organized a coup d’etat67 by 
marching to the Porte, killing the War Minister Nazım Paşa, and forcing Kamil Paşa 
to resign. The CUP formed a new cabinet with Mahmud Şevket Paşa as its grand 
vizier and War Minister. Soon after, a supporter of the Hürriyet ve İtilaf shot the 
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65 It was called “Büyük Kabine” in Turkish because of the veteran bureaucrats who had an 
understanding and formed the cabinet. 
66 Lewis, p. 223 “Their objective was to remove an illegal government and parliament, to break the 
power of the CUP, to hold new and free elections, and to return to constitutional legality. Like all 
opposition parties of the Young Turk period, this group of military conspirators demanded the 
withdrawal of the army from politics. The army would of course have to mend what the army had 
marred; after that it could return to its proper task of defending the Empire, leaving its government to 
the politicians and officials. Faithful to this principle, the group accepted no civilian recruits, allowed 
its numbers to accept no governmental appointments.” 
67 Known in Turkish as “Babıali Ayaklanması”. 
 38 
grand vizier. This caused the inner circle of the CUP to tighten control over  Ottoman 
politics.  
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B. International Affairs 
 
As the second Constitution was being proclaimed in 1908, the Ottomans witnessed a 
troubling international situation. Soon after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, 
Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria declared its 
complete independence and annexed the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia, 
and Crete was united with Greece. While all these actions impacted the Ottomans, 
further damaging their belief that the Powers would fulfill their obligation to protect 
Ottoman integrity, none was more damaging than the Austrian action in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina on the pretext that Serbia 
was getting stronger because of support from France and Russia. In September 1908, 
Austria-Hungarian Foreign Minister Alois Lexa Aehrenthal met secretly with 
Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Iswolsky in Buchlau, and reached an agreement 
by which Russia agreed to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in return 
for the latter’s acceptance of Russia’s rights to occupy and control the Ottoman 
Straits. The agreement was never put into force, however, because while France was 
subsequently non-committal on the issue, Great Britain and Germany absolutely 
opposed the plan, the latter because of the fear that it would jeopardize its economic 
and political influence in the Ottoman Empire. Germany, however, did want a strong 
Austria in the Balkans to prevent Russian expansion into the area, so it gave full 
consent to Austria-Hungary's action in Bosnia-Herzegovina.68 
The Austria-Hungarian fait accompli provoked all the Balkan states and the 
Great Powers. It was like a try-out of the First World War.69 Serbia was ready for 
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war. However, Russia could not support it, because it was not ready for a major war 
after its defeat by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Without real 
support from the Powers, therefore, the Ottoman Empire finally consented to the 
annexation in return for an indemnity, though its faith in the willingness of the 
Powers to live up to their treaty obligations was further shattered. 
The Austria-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia ended without causing a major 
war, but it created many problems for the future. Oral Sander claimed that it was the 
beginning of the crises and defeats, which would erase the Ottoman Empire from 
history.70 In the Balkans, Bulgaria and Serbia began to pursue aggressive policies, 
which would eventually lead to the Balkan Wars. In the international arena, 
humiliated Russia71 had no option but to join the Entente, which had been concluded 
by the French and the British in 1904. With the secret treaty of Racconigi in 1909, 
Italy agreed to support the Balkan status quo in case of an Austrian threat, in return 
for Russia’s recognition of its interests in Tripoli. 
The alliances were complete. The Russian-French Dual Alliance of 1893, 
the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, the Moroccan crisis of 1905, the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907 and the Reval Meeting of 1908 between England and Russia 
combined with the Bosnian crisis roughly formed the blocs for a total major war: 
Germany and the Austria-Hungarian Empire on one side, and France, Great Britain 
and Russia on the other. 
The second Moroccan crisis in 1911 made sure that both sides were ready 
for war. The Agadir crisis also impelled Italy to move upon Tripoli by opening the 
way to the French protectorate of Morocco. Italy’s conquest and annexation of 
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Tripoli was the signal for the Balkan states to make a concerted attack upon 
Turkey.72 
On October 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, declared war 
on the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans began to experience defeats on both fronts by 
the Serbians and Bulgarians as the new War Minister Nazım Paşa did not apply the 
defensive war strategy of the former Chief-of-Staff Ahmet İzzet Paşa who was in 
Yemen fighting against the Arab rebels.  
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C. Ottoman-German Relations 
 
During the five years from the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 to the Bab-ı Ali coup 
d’etat of 1913, according to the Ottoman point of view, relations with Germany did 
not follow a steady path due to many domestic and international events. Many people 
thought that the revolution had created a pro-British atmosphere in the Ottoman 
government circles. It was true that most of the Young Turk leaders were British and 
French sympathizers.73 Furthermore, German support for the Austrian annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina turned the public opinion against Germany and the German 
Military Commission in the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish press was urging the 
government to send the German military officers back, and some generals shared this 
view.74 
In order to balance the German influence which had increased greatly 
before the Young Turk Revolution, Grand Vezir Kamil Paşa brought in British naval 
officers to reorganize the Ottoman navy, and also limited the German military 
officers to no more than fifteen to twenty men of whom none would be below the 
rank of Colonel, a move which caused anxiety and dissatisfaction among the 
Germans already there.75  
The Germans’ fear was not unfounded. The Young Turks were leaning 
towards Britain because they regarded Abdulhamid's friendship for the autocratic 
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Kaiser Wilhelm as the basis of his own autocratic policies.76 In furtherance of his 
effort to balance the German influence following the annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Grand Vizier sent to London two leading Young Turks, Dr. Nazım 
Bey and Ahmet Rıza Bey to propose an alliance with Britain, an overture which was, 
however, rejected by the British.77  
In the autumn of 1908, the Baghdad railroad concession granted in 1903 
became a subject of intense discussions in the Ottoman parliament. Since the 
concession was seen as the means by which Abdulhamid gained friendship and 
support from Wilhelm II, the Young Turks felt that certain undisclosed provisions in 
the Concession treaty endangered Ottoman political independence, while giving 
Germany political as well as economic and financial advantages. The Baghdad 
representative in the Ottoman parliament, İsmail Hakkı Bey, proposed that the 
existing contracts with the Deutsche Bank, the basic core of the concessions, be 
repudiated outright. The Ottoman minister of Finance, Cavid Bey, was more 
moderate on the subject. He believed that the concession violated Ottoman economic 
and administrative independence, but he felt the solution was to revise the agreement 
in the interest of Ottoman sovereignty, without actual repudiation.78 Witnessing these 
developments in İstanbul closely, the German ambassador, Baron Marschall von 
Bieberstein warned the German chancellor, Prince von Bülow that German influence 
was waning and some actions had be taken to stop these proposals from being put 
into effect. 
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In order to reorganize the Ottoman Navy, the Young Turks placed it under 
the command of a British admiral, Admiral Gamble. In addition, many British 
advisors were brought to the Ottoman Empire and entered into several ministries, 
while a French officer was made inspector-general of the gendarmerie.79 All these 
developments worried the Germans. One of the directors of the Deutsche Bank, Karl 
Helfferich stated that the dream of Berlin-Baghdad Railway had fallen into ruins.80 
The only German who did not seem to be worried about Germany’s position in the 
Ottoman Empire was Wilhelm II, who believed that the Revolution of 1908 had been 
the product of the Young Turk military officers who were trained in the German 
military traditions. Furthermore, Wilhelm II also believed that because of the 
ongoing problems between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain and Russia, the 
Ottomans would have to continue to rely on German protection. Nevertheless, 
German influence in the Ottoman Empire was stronger than that of the British or 
French only in areas of railroad construction and arms sales.81 The Germans could 
continue their influence in Turkey only if they were not defeated in those areas by 
the other Great Powers. 
It was the suppression of the Counter-revolution in April 1909 by the Action 
Army that gave Germany the opportunity it was seeking to take back its favored 
position in Ottoman affairs. Britain and France denounced the suppression of the 
insurrectionists, though they had supported the liberal regime that was being 
suppressed. Furthermore, British interference in Crete and the British support of the 
rebellious Sheikh of Kuwait endangered the British position in the Ottoman Empire 
at the same time when the CUP leaders also learned that it had been the British 
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Intelligence Service, which had organized the counter-revolution.82 Germany, on the 
other hand, supported the suppression of the counter-revolution and the restoration of 
the Constitutional Regime. Whereas France and England had denounced the rising of 
Turkish nationalism and pan-Islamic revival, for Germany it was good news as 
Germany’s policy in the Near East was based upon strengthening the Ottoman 
Empire.83 
After the suppression of the counter-revolution, the Young Turk military 
leaders began to intervene in political affairs while taking control of various 
important posts. Chief-of-Staff İzzet Paşa requested the government to bring Colmar 
Von der Goltz back to Istanbul as military advisor for a new effort to reorganize the 
Ottoman army. The Ottoman government officially applied for his services to the 
German government in May 1909. Von der Goltz agreed to undertake temporary 
service in the Ottoman Empire and he came to İstanbul in June 1909.84 Besides his 
military duties, German Chancellor von Bülow also ordered von der Goltz to do 
everything he could to influence the Ottomans to favor Germany in economic and 
political matters as well .He thus had to do all he could to restore the Anatolian 
railroad concessions as well as to secure Ottoman purchases of German arms and 
armaments85 In addition to the appointment of Goltz, Germany also agreed to 
dispatch eleven military officers to serve in the Ottoman Army for a term of three 
years. Colmar von der Goltz and the German military officers came to Turkey in 
October. In addition, fourteen Ottoman military officers were sent to Germany for 
advanced military education.86 
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Von der Goltz stayed in Turkey for three months. During this short time, he 
prepared a comprehensive program for military maneuvers in the Balkans and 
İstanbul. He designed a military maneuver in which two Ottoman corps participated. 
He established a drilling ground in which 120 officers could be trained in one 
semester. He also prepared pamphlets called “Advice for the German Military Tutors 
in the Ottoman Service”. He then returned to Germany, but continued his service to 
the Ottomans by sending reform proposals, but he did not return again until the early 
years of the First World War.87 
In spite of his significant influence on the Ottoman military leaders, Von der 
Goltz’s second service in the Ottoman Empire was not direct or sustained. Indirectly, 
however, he had an important influence on Turkish politics until the arrival of Von 
Sanders Military Commission in 1913, since most of the Ottoman military leaders in 
the younger generation had been trained according to his program during his first 
service in the Empire. Additionally, the leading military figures such as Ahmet İzzet 
Paşa and Mahmut Şevket Paşa were the generals who had been to Germany for 
training. 
The renewal of the German military officers was a good opportunity for 
Germany to strengthen its position in the Ottoman Empire, but it was not enough. 
The real opportunity came when France and England rejected the Ottomans when the 
Turkish government tried to raise a loan of 30,000,000 francs secured by the customs 
receipts of the Ottoman Empire. France demanded that the Ottoman government 
consent to have its budget administered by a French adviser in return for the loan. 
The Minister of Finance, Cavid Bey did not accept the French proposal. When he 
went to London to negotiate the same loan, the British government demanded that 
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the Ottoman government renegotiate the Baghdad Railway Concession in return for 
the loan. The British Foreign Office informed Cavid Bey that the existing concession 
was not in the best interest of the Ottoman Empire and it was a significant menace to 
the position of British trade in Mesopotamia. Rejected by the French and British, the 
Ottoman government turned to Germany for the loan. On request from the German 
government, the Deutsche Bank agreed on a contract for the entire issue of 
30,000,000 francs of the Ottoman Four Per Cent Loan of 1910.88 
As Cavid Bey stated in his memorandum, the loan agreement was a great 
diplomatic victory for Germany.89 It was a milestone on the road to a future 
Ottoman-German partnership. With this loan agreement, Wilhelm II was proved 
right on his foreseeing on the Turkish-German relationship. In late October 1910, in 
the message he sent to the Ottoman government, he seemed quite happy with the 
developments in Turkey. He especially appreciated the works of Goltz and assured 
the Turks that there would be no delays on the loan, which would reach the Ottoman 
treasury in November. However, he stated that Turkey should accept the partition of 
the sphere of influences in Persia by Great Britain and Russia.90 
German influence was increasing. In February 1910, Marschall von 
Bieberstein received a new order of arms in huge amounts from the Ottoman 
government. In the same year, the net revenues of the Anatolian Railway Company 
reached 5,169,894 French Francs.91 The German railways proved profitable for the 
Germans, and at the same time profiting the Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was 
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compensating the kilometer guarantees for the railways. The Anatolian and Baghdad 
Railways were achieving their prospected profits. “They increased political security 
in Asia Minor; they brought about an economic renaissance in the homeland of the 
Turks; they justified the investment of public funds which was necessary to bring the 
system to completion.”92  
The German investments were not enough to put the Ottoman economy on 
track, though. In order to get a relief, the Ottoman government decided to have a four 
per cent increase in customs duties. However, the British and French governments 
declared that they would object to an increase unless they acquired the concessions 
they wanted in Mesopotamia. This move also created animosity against the British 
and French in the Ottoman government and press. “The press roundly denounced the 
British and said that once again Turkey had been shown the wisdom of friendship for 
Germany.”93 
The Germans did accept the Ottoman proposal for the customs duties 
increase, but they also decided to abandon their right to construct the railway from 
Baghdad to Basra because of the critical international situation. Germany did not 
want to have problems with England at a time when the Moroccan crisis (1911) was 
increasing tensions. Therefore, Germany and the Ottoman Empire signed a new 
concession agreement on March 21, 1911. Here, it is obvious that the Germans 
wanted to extend the limits of their economic and political influence on Turkey 
without having big problems with England.  
The British and French rejection of the increase in the Ottoman customs 
duties made the Ottomans approach the Germans further. The relations between 
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Germany and the Ottoman Empire assumed a cordial character. The official and 
semi-official visits and meetings between the two countries progressed in pace.94 In 
June 1911, the Ottoman counselor in London, Cevat Bey, and the German counselor, 
Kühlmann, met to discuss the Baghdad Railroad and the Moroccan crisis, and 
exchanged views.95 In September 1911, “the Sultan has conferred high decorations 
on Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, and the German Ministers 
for War, Marine and Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the General Staff, and on other 
high personages”, when they visited Turkey. Even the British newspapers such as 
The Advocate of India said “the moment is opportune for Germany to give 
expression to her friendship by supporting Turkey, not merely in economic 
transactions, but also in certain pending political questions.”96 However, the Italian 
declaration of the occupation of Tripoli formed a setback in Ottoman-German 
relations. 
In September 1911, Italy invaded Tripoli. Trusting the improving relations 
with Germany, Turkey asked for German support. However, Germany did not want 
to jeopardize the international balance of power. Additionally, Germany did not want 
to lose Italy as an ally. Germany had an understanding attitude for the Ottoman cries, 
and many Germans thought that the loss of Tripoli would put Turkey in a very 
difficult situation. The only effort by the Germans came from Baron Marschall who 
recommended that the Ottomans put armed resistance in Tripoli. Actually, rather 
than being optimistic, he thought that the loss of Tripoli would encourage the British 
to annex Iraq, and it would be a real menace to the German influence in the Near 
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East.97 The Ottomans felt alone in the face of the Italian fait accompli, which they 
believed was very unfair. Then, the Ottoman government turned to the British, and 
proposed an alliance. However, Britain rejected the proposal.98 
The Tripolitan affair showed Germany’s real intentions toward the Ottoman 
Empire. Although, Kaiser was a friend of Abdulhamid, he did not have consistent 
thoughts about the value of the Ottoman friendship and partnership. He believed in 
the potential benefits of the Ottoman Empire for Germany, but he never thought of 
the Ottoman Empire as an ally like Austria-Hungary. As the developments will 
show, Germany never considered the Ottoman Army trained and equipped enough to 
make a sound ally in a potential European War until the outbreak of the First World 
War. The only concern of the German Kaiser and his governments was to increase 
German trade and investments in the Ottoman Empire. Only, in this concern was 
Germany consistent in its policies towards the Ottoman Empire.99 Germany acted in 
accordance to its Realpolitik especially in international issues. Concerning the Italian 
annexation, Kaiser told his Foreign Minister “the Ottoman-Italian War is not 
dangerous for our interests. The Italian forces are settling in North Africa; by this 
way Italy will compete against France both in the Mediterranean Sea and North 
Africa. Therefore, the challenge between France and Italy will throw Italy to our side 
(Germany and Austria-Hungary).”100 
Germany showed the same attitude in the Balkan Wars just after the 
Ottoman-Italian War. Instead of preventing the war, Germany left Turkey alone. The 
Germans believed that the Ottoman Army could defeat the armies of the Balkan 
League with the help of the Krupp artillery and the advices of Von der Goltz. 
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Actually, it was obvious that Germany did not care much for the Ottoman victory or 
defeat. The Germans even thought that Turkey should leave the Balkans in favor of 
Anatolia.101  
Germany did not want to attract Russian hostility, and eventually cause 
Russia to participate fully in the Anglo-French Entente. For this aim, Germany 
already signed agreements with Russia in November 1910, and August 1911 in 
Potsdam. With these agreements, Germany recognized Russian sphere of influence 
in Northern Persia, and agreed not to support Austria-Hungary in its Balkan policies. 
In return, Russia gave up its objections to Baghdad Railway and accepted the 
extension of a railway line to Tehran by the Germans, which would be connected to 
railways it would build in Persia.102 Furthermore, when the Ottomans appealed to the 
German government for the rejection of Russian requests on the renegotiation of and 
changes in the Turkish Straits regime, Germany informed Turkey that it was not 
against the renegotiation of the Straits regime. The indifference and the negative 
attitude of Germany on this issue was clearly criticized by the German ambassador, 
Baron Marschall who tried to convince his government about the potential menace of 
Russian domination in the Ottoman Empire. He even wanted to resign from his post 
if his warnings were not taken serious. However, his warnings were disregarded.103 
After a couple of months, this ambitious ambassador who was regarded as the real 
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architect of the establishment of German influence in İstanbul104 was replaced with 
Baron von Wangenheim. Later his government appointed him to London.105 
As a matter of fact, it was not the German military techniques but the 
German diplomacy or policies that harmed the Ottoman Empire. From the Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908 to the Bab-ı Ali coup d’etat, German-Ottoman relations did 
not follow a consistent path. The Ottomans began to favor the Germans when they 
requested the second service of Goltz, and Germany provided the loan that the 
Ottomans needed in 1910. However, the Italian and Balkan Wars proved to the 
Ottomans that they were actually isolated in European diplomatic circles. The 
international developments showed that all of the Great powers had imperialistic 
designs on the Ottoman Empire, which constituted the core of the Eastern Question. 
Germany provided an exception only in the sense that unlike the other Great Powers, 
it did not want the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Germany wanted to transform 
Turkey into a minor partner or a satellite state in the Near East. “While Britain, 
France, and Russia were each tugging at the best portions of the Empire from 
outside, the Reich was endeavoring to hold it together by capturing the whole from 
within.”106 With its penetration pacifique policy, Germany favored the policy of 
controlling the economy and military of the Ottoman Empire in friendly terms, while 
at the same time trying to stay in the new ‘Concert of Europe’ that was based on 
disagreements and deterrence rather than agreements.   
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FROM THE RAID ON THE PORTE 
TO THE SECRET ALLIANCE OF AUGUST 2, 1914 
 
 
A. Developments Before the Arrival of Von Sanders Mission 
 
The famous “Raid on the Sublime Porte” occurred on January 23, 1913. The 
Ottoman Cabinet was meeting in order to prepare a note to the Great Powers about 
the armistice negotiations then going on in London designed to end the First Balkan 
War. On that day in the afternoon, “Enver (later Paşa) led an army band into the 
Porte building, burst into a (the) cabinet meeting, and forced (Sadrazam) Kamil 
(Paşa) to resign at gunpoint.”107 The CUP declared that it designed the raid in order 
to end the defeats in the Balkans, and take Edirne back from the Bulgarians by taking 
over government.108 The inner circle of the CUP dominated by Enver and Talat, who 
were the real designers of the coup d’etat, arranged for General Mahmut Şevket Paşa 
to become the new grand vizier, while Cemal Bey was made commander of the First 
Army, which was the garrison of İstanbul. Although Kamil Paşa’s cabinet had been 
overthrown, Mahmut Şevket Paşa appointed only three Unionists to the new cabinet, 
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leaving all the previous ministers in their places. A week later, at the request of 
Enver Paşa, the Sultan appointed respected general Ahmet İzzet Paşa as Chief of the 
General Staff.  
The new government first tried to secure a base for restoring public order 
through key military and civilian appointments. It then turned its attention to the 
issue of foreign affairs. Most of the ministers joined Enver and the young officers im 
desiring to resume the war in order to secure a more favorable settlement than that 
being prepared in London. Mahmut Şevket Paşa and Ahmet İzzet Paşa, however, 
opposed the idea on the grounds that the army was not ready. However, “there were 
those Unionist civilians who felt the need for an immediate military success in order 
to consolidate their position.”109 The Grand Vizier therefore, insisted to the London 
Conference that Edirne and eastern Thrace be returned before the Ottoman Empire 
would agree to peace. Without agreement, however, the conference broke up on 
January 30 and the Ottomans resumed the fight.110 
But as the war continued, the Ottoman army continued to suffer defeats on 
almost all fronts. At the same time, the new government tried to reform the army. In 
February, the Regulation for the General Military Organization and the Service Dress 
and Uniform Regulation 111 were put into force. German Ambassador "Wangenheim 
was able to report a general feeling in ruling circles favoring requests to foreign 
governments for aid in reforming the Ottoman Empire. He continued that the 
Ottomans hoped the Kaiser would place a German general, who, aided by German 
officers, would reorganize the army."112  
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On April 24, 1913 Mahmut Şevket Paşa asked Wangenheim's opinion about 
the desirability of asking for a new German military reform comission, stating that 
the Germans had been reforming the Ottoman Army for more than thirty years, and it 
was impossible to change that tradition at that late date.113 However, the ‘German 
style’ Ottoman Army continued to fail in the ongoing wars. “In the meantime, in the 
face of all the disasters Mahmut Şevket had to offer a restoration of truce and full 
acceptance of the powers’ peace terms. The armistice was restored on April 16, 
negotiations resumed on May 30, and ten days later the Treaty of London signed, 
with the Midye-Enez line being established as the new Ottoman boundary and with 
Thrace and Edirne in enemy hands.”114 
The First Balkan War ended calamitously for the Ottomans and the 
Ottoman Empire entered into a state of havoc. Besides the material losses, the 
Empire collapsed psychologically. Undecided about what to do next and without 
hope for the future, the Ottomans began to seriously question the value of German 
friendship and military assistance. In the European press, the victory of the Balkan 
League was attributed to the superiority of French Cruiseot artillery over German 
Krupp Artillery.115 The popular view in the Ottoman Empire was that the German 
military reformers had been unsuccessful in reorganizing the Ottoman Army. 
Mahmud Şevket Paşa was not, however, of the same opinion, and with the support of 
the inner cabinet of the CUP, led by Enver and Talat, on May 22, 1913, he asked 
Wangenheim to relay his request to Berlin for a new German military mission. 
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The defeat in the Balkans had, indeed, proved how weak the Ottoman 
Empire was. The CUP and the Ottoman intellectuals now felt really drastic reforms 
were needed in order to save the Empire from collapse and destruction. They 
understood, however, that the Empire had to be careful about the nature of the new 
German military mission. The new situation in the Balkans had changed the views of 
all the European Powers about the Ottoman Empire. The ongoing negotiations 
between Germany and England about the railroad concessions took new shape. 
Germany, for one, began to define its future policies regarding Anatolia on the 
supposition that the Ottoman Empire would finally be partitioned.116 
In the spring of 1913, Wilhelm II agreed to send a new military mission to 
Istanbul, but at the same time showed that his real intention was to use it to control 
Ottoman affairs, while at the same time preventing Russia from dominating Anatolia. 
To achieve this end, he tried hard to secure an agreement with Britain regarding the 
settlement that he made if the Ottoman Empire was partitioned: 
Let us ensure that the partition shall not be carried without us. I want 
Mesopotamia, Alexandretta, Mersina. The sensible Turks are already 
expecting this fate patiently… It is very important to have definite 
objectives in this event (the partition), instead of warning the Turks, which 
the present Turkish government does not deserve and would never be 
acted on anyway… I could not wish for a better… merciless judgement 
upon the policy of great adventures and Ententes of my uncle Edward VII! 
In the long run a policy directed against Germans with Slavs and Gauls is 
absolutely unworkable for the Anglo-Saxons! We shall find one another in 
Asia Minor, either for the sake of Turkey… or at her expense!117 
 
It is not certain that the German Foreign Office and General Staff shared 
Wilhelm II's views, but in any case Germany went ahead to seek British friendship in 
order to detach it from Russia and France, thus isolating France and preventing 
Russia from realizing its goals in the Near East. In İstanbul, without giving any 
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signals about the Kaiser's real intentions, Wangenheim succeeded in showing 'sincere' 
German friendship to the Ottoman government. The political chaos in the Ottoman 
Empire, however, made it very difficult for Mahmut Şevket Paşa to understand 
Germany's real intentions. Turfan argues that “...the real cause of the Grand Vizier’s 
wish to invite a prominent German general to reorganize the Ottoman Army, was his 
prevailing aspiration establish explicit control over the officer corps.”118 Whether this 
statement is true or not, the vizier tried to use the new mission as a political tool, 
especially against the Ottoman liberals who were being supported by the British. On 
June 11, 1913, however, Mahmut Şevket Paşa was assassinated. Cemal Paşa’s 
memoirs stated that it was the work of the Ottoman liberals led by Kamil Paşa, Damat 
Salih Paşa and Fitzmaurice, and Tyrel from the British Embassy.119 The assassination 
might have been the work of the military circles,120 because Mahmut Şevket Paşa had 
been working to keep the military officers out of politics. In a telegram of 13 June, 
two days after the assassination, the British ambassador wrote: 
It is not clear whether murder was a result of an opposition plot or of an 
act of revenge for assassination of General Nazım Paşa at the Porte on 23rd 
January. Despite denials there would seem to have been a participation of 
section of military element.121  
 
On June 15, 1913, German general Otto Liman von Sanders received a 
letter asking whether he would accept to lead the military reform mission that would 
be sent to Turkey. He accepted, and before coming to Turkey, Wilhelm II ordered 
him to draw politics out of the Ottoman army.122 The Kaiser might well have known 
more about Mahmut Şevket’s death that he told Von Sanders, since many Ottomans 
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who were connected with the CUP were very much involved in politics when he 
arrived. 
Soon after Mahmut Şevket Paşa’s death, the CUP replaced him as Grand 
Vizier with Said Halim Paşa, a member of the Mehmed Ali dynasty of Egypt, who 
was also a member of the CUP. The assignment of four other CUP members to key 
cabinet positions started the CUP dictatorship, which took over the Empire soon 
afterwards. The new grand vizier started his work just as the second Balkan War 
began, with Bulgaria being attacked by its former allies who were dissatisfied with 
the London settlement. 
In the meantime, the CUP led the Ottoman press and public in advocating 
restoration of Edirne. The cabinet was divided, with some members 
fearing that such an advance would only lead to a disastrous new war. In 
the end, however, Talat and Enver prevailed. On July 21 the Ottoman 
army was able to reoccupy all of eastern Thrace and move into Edirne 
without meeting any resistance, since the Bulgarians had withdrawn their 
army to meet their former allies. In response to the Ottoman push the latter 
soon made peace, though at Bulgarian expense, in the Treaty of Bucharest 
(August 10).123 
 
The Treaty of İstanbul between Turkey and Bulgaria, signed on September 
29, 1913, ended the Second Balkan War with substantial losses for the Ottomans. 
The Army lost fourteen infantry divisions and 250,000 soldiers. Only, six out of its 
original forty-three infantry divisions were saved without real damage. “This was a 
military disaster of unprecedented magnitude for the empire, which all but destroyed 
the regular Turkish Army as an effective fighting force.”124 The Empire lost 83 
percent of its land in Europe and 69 percent of its European population. Sixty 
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hundred square miles of European territories (Albania, Macedonia and Eastern 
Rumelia) were lost. İstanbul was filled with refugees who brought epidemics with 
them. The Ottoman Empire lost whatever prestige it still had in European public 
opinion, and the Ottoman people fell into real despair. 
For the Ottoman public, however, despite the losses of population and 
territory and the devastation inflicted on the army and the Ottoman public overall, 
“the recapture of Edirne stimulated a mass Ottoman exaltation so intense that the 
CUP’s right to rule unopposed was accepted and confirmed without further 
discussion or opposition”.125 The fact that the CUP had been able to abandon the 
Treaty of London and retake Edirne solidified its hold on to government, which 
enabled it to start new efforts at reform as well as to support the new German 
military mission. 
After several months of negotiations, the agreement for the new German 
military mission was concluded on November 9, 1913. The German government 
appointed Von Sanders as the head of a commission of forty-two officers, which was 
given substantial duties and responsibilities to reorganize and modernize the 
Ottoman army.126  
The government was later criticized for the agreement, which equipped the 
new mission with vast authority in the Ottoman army. However, given the diplomatic 
situation, the Ottoman government desperately needed German support in order to 
save the Empire from further losses, particularly since Britain was supporting the 
Russian efforts to introduce reforms into Eastern Anatolia which it was planning to 
use to secure an autonomous Armenia under its control, thus inflicting substantial 
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new losses on the Ottomans at the same time that Russian was developing new 
ambitions to gain control over Istanbul itself as well as the Straits in order to achieve 
its ambition of controlling the waterways that connected it with the open seas.127 
The Ottomans had tried to end their diplomatic isolation following the 
Balkan Wars by proposing alliances with Britain in June 1913, as well as with 
Germany in September Both offers, however, were rejected.128 After the alliance 
proposals were rejected, in the face of the Russian threat, the Ottoman government 
accepted the German military mission as the only alternative.129 On December 1913, 
Wilhelm II stated that:  
…As they (the instructions to Wangenheim) are herein drafted, no! They 
look like a capitulation on our part to Russia! I am no longer in the mood 
to bargain with Russian wishes at the cost of my army and Turkey… Once 
again Russia, as so often before, has tried one of her several attempts at 
bluff at our cost and through her allies… Turkey’s prestige will increase as 
the result of any great Russian disgrace!130 
 
Wilhelm II was ready to support Turkey to the end at Russian expense. However, as it 
is visible from his thoughts about British cooperation, he respected Turkey’s prestige 
only if Russia expressed its claims on Turkey. Otherwise, Germany, in particular the 
Kaiser, could take any vital decisions at Turkish expense. 
The British, French, and Russian ambassadors mounted diplomatic pressure 
in an effort to limit the Von Sanders mission, even before it arrived in İstanbul on 
December 14, 1913.131 However, Otto Liman von Sanders came to İstanbul on 
December 14, 1913 with the mission of 42 officers who were mostly captains and 
majors in the German Army. The next day, Sultan Mehmed Reşad officially accepted 
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Sanders and the mission to the Ottoman service.132 The Ottoman Empire agreed to 
give Sanders the rank of full general as the commander of the First Army in Istanbul, 
with a ranking in protocol, which placed him immediately after the Ottoman Minister 
of War.  
Britain, France, and Russia heavily criticized the presence of the new 
German military mission. Russia, in particular, did not want Sanders to control the 
Turkish First Army, because it meant that the Straits were in fact under the authority 
of a German general. According to the Ottoman documents reporting the minutes of 
the Austria-Hungarian parliament, Russia conceived the transfer of Sanders as an 
insult to itself.133 Russia insisted that the German Foreign Office should have 
consulted it before deciding to send the mission to İstanbul. The German Foreign 
Office replied that von Sanders’ transfer had been arranged by a personal order of the 
Kaiser, given through the Military Cabinet, without any consultation with them.134 On 
the other side, France and England condemned the transfer of the mission as a 
political act rather than a military support. 
The year 1913 ended with the German Military Commission working with 
the Turkish army. Von Sanders’ powers included the right to appoint and dismiss the 
German officers in his mission, which gave him practical control over everything 
they did.135 The Ottomans, who had been left in despair and desolation by the results 
of the Balkan Wars, were relieved and hopeful for the future. The CUP, which 
controlled the Ottoman government throughout the year, now felt itself in a position 
in which it could start the reforms the Empire needed at a time when Europe seemed 
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to be headed for a major war. The CUP leaders felt that the social and economic 
development of the Empire would be impossible without a strong army, given the 
fragility of its situation. The help came from Germany, which in fact saw the Empire 
as no more than a potential satellite useful for German economic investment and for 
the supply of raw material. It therefore opposed concessions to its still-potential allies, 
Italy and Austria-Hungary.136 The disastrous Ottoman losses in the Balkan Wars, 
however, made the Germans, especially the Kaiser, think that partition of the 
Ottoman Empire was inevitable and that all means should be used in order to limit the 
resulting benefits which might flow to Germany's historic enemy. Instead of acting as 
the Ottomans’ big brother, therefore, Germany was ready to cooperate with the 
British in dividing what was left in the possession of the Sultan so long as the real 
benefits were kept out of the hands of the Russians. 
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B. The Ottoman Empire Before July 1914 
 
The CUP, which was the actual ruler of the Ottoman Empire following the Raid on 
the Porte, consolidated its grip on power in early 1914. During this time the CUP 
went through intense discussions regarding the appointments to principal positions in 
the government. When Enver returned from Edirne, Talat, one of the most powerful 
members of the Committee, informed him that they wanted him to become Minister 
of War.137 The other contender for the ministry was Cemal, who had been promoted 
to the rank of colonel at the same time as Enver, on December18, 1913.138 
Current Minister of War Ahmed İzzet Paşa had opposed the CUP's desire to 
begin reforming the Ottoman army by forcing its senior officers into retirement. He 
was therefore forced to retire in favor of Enver, so the first step in the reform process 
could begin.139 The CUP's desire to substitute Enver for the current Minister of War 
Ahmet İzzet Paşa resulted from their desire to begin reforming the Army by 
forceably retiring its senior officers, most of whom were long past their prime, an 
idea which Ahmed İzzet had resisted.140 Talat got Cemal to agree by offering him the 
position of Minister of the Navy.. Appointment as Minister of War required the rank 
of Brigadier General, however, while Enver still was only a Colonel. The CUP 
solved this problem by increasing his seniority level on the grounds of his services in 
both the Tripolitanian and Balkan wars. In three days, therefore, Cemal and Enver 
were both promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, thus making possible their 
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appointments to the senior military ministries.141 Ahmet İzzet Paşa resigned, and on 
January 3, 1914 Enver Paşa became the Minister of War at the age of thirty-four.142 
Cemal Paşa became the Minister of Navy. Five days later, Enver Paşa became the 
Chief of the General Staff.143 
With these appointments, the CUP's hold on governmental power was 
assured, at least for the moment. With the German Reform Mission working with 
him, Enver continued the army reforms which had been begun in the spring of 1913, 
introducing ever more radical measures as time went on. Edward Erickson states 
that: 
Between July 1913 and August 1914, the Turkish Army was undergoing 
an enormous reorganization and reconstruction effort as a result of the 
Balkan Wars. Compounding this huge task was Enver Paşa’s 
determination to rid the army of older and less active officers, obstruction 
to modernization. Over thirteen hundred officers were involuntarily retired 
during this period.144 
 
In this manner, the rule of the Triumvirate, which dominated the Ottoman 
Empire until the end of the First World War, began. Enver Paşa’s Prussian-style 
discipline soon prevailed in the army. At the same time, Cemal Paşa’s techniques at 
getting information and suppressing political opposition centers prevented any kind 
of real threat to the new regime. Talat Bey was the political genius who provided the 
link between the inner circle of the CUP and both the cabinet and the ambassadors to 
the Porte. İstanbul was therefore politically ready for a war in which the control of 
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the political leadership and the masses would be easier and more complete than in 
the past. Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Secretary to Sultan Mehmed Reşad, states in his 
memoirs: 
Once Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa seized control of the Army and the 
Navy, they carried out so-called ‘reformation’ in the Navy and Army by 
dismissing almost all of the officers who graduated from the military 
schools before Enver and Cemal. Thereafter, the reins of government 
passed from the hands of the Sublime Porte to those of Enver Paşa.145 
 
These Ottoman military reforms were of considerable concern to Russia, 
which quickly designed new plans to achieve its ambitions in the Straits and Anatolia. 
Combined with British and French protests, Russia managed to force the Ottomans to 
change Von Sanders' position. Originally he had been appointed as an Ottoman 
marshal and head of the Ottoman General Army Inspectorate.146 Russia, however, 
demanded in response that an international conference be immediately convened to 
decide on the future of the East Anatolian provinces where most Armenians resided. 
On February 6, 1914 the resulting Yeniköy Agreement (Yeniköy Mukavelenamesi) 
was signed between the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire, according to which 
reports prepared by neutral inspectors from the Netherlands and Norway would be the 
basis for the reforms to be applied in Eastern Anatolia. In the end, however, the 
agreement was never applied because of the outbreak of the First World War. 147 
During the negotiations on reforms in Eastern Anatolia, Germany tried to 
counterbalance the aggressive Russian demands, which it understood would 
eventually lead to the autonomy of Eastern Anatolian provinces under Armenian and 
ultimately Russian control. At the same time, however, while supposedly defending 
Ottoman interests in the matter, Germany was negotiating secretly with Britain about 
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dividing the same provinces into spheres of influence divided between the two.148 In 
fact Germany opposed any partition only if it did not share the spoils. 149 
It is presumptuous to assume that the First World War broke out because of 
the Russian aims at occupying the Straits and İstanbul.150 The Russian threat to 
accomplish this was, however, instrumental in bringing the Ottomans into the war. 
On January 14, 1914, Russia established the secret Commission for the Occupation of 
the Straits, consisting of several Russian ministers, ambassadors and the Chief of 
General Staff, which quickly drew up a detailed plan to occupy the Straits, submitting 
it to Tsar Nicholas II on March 28, 1914.151 The Ottoman Military Intelligence 
Service was only partially aware of this threat.152 Russia delayed execution of this 
plan because of concerns regarding the feasibility of the occupation. It feared, with 
considerable justification, that Britain would never allow such a move without 
general international agreement. Russia therefore decided to delay the effort until it 
was part of a general war. In the meantime, Russia would try to negotiate with the 
Ottomans to secure a Russian protectorate over the Straits like the one, which had 
been attempted during the Egyptian crisis of 1833. In the end, however, strong 
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Ottoman opposition to any such plan caused the Russians to delay, and ultimately 
abandon the plan.153 
There were few reasons for the Ottoman Empire to ally with Russia. In the 
spring of 1914, however, Germany feared that such an arrangement might in fact take 
place. The German military mission in Turkey was doing well, and Colonel Friedrich 
Bronsart von Schellendorf was appointed as the first Assistant Chief of Staff of the 
Ottoman General Staff. Despite this, Kaiser Wilhelm II feared that the presence of the 
mission was not adequate to keep the Ottomans on his side. In Eagles on the 
Crescent, Weber reports that German ambassador Wangenheim learned at this time 
that Enver had conferred several times with Russian agents in order to use their 
money to bribe the internal Ottoman police as a means of strengthening his 
dictatorship.154 Weber further states that the Austria-Hungarian ambassador to 
İstanbul, Pallavicini was accusing Wangenheim of indifference in the face of 
warming Ottoman relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Russia in order to secure a 
Balkan alliance.155 
Before the summer of 1914, Germany tried to keep the Ottoman Empire in 
its orbit without any commitment or guarantee except the military mission. However, 
the Ottoman Empire was not fully committed to the German cause.156 The German 
military leaders did not even think that the mission could in fact improve the Ottoman 
Army. In March 1914, the German Chief of Staff von Moltke wired the Austrian 
Chief of Staff Hötzendorf that the Ottoman Empire was not worth anything militarily, 
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likening his military mission to doctors taking care of a patient destined to death.157 In 
May and June, Wangenheim reported to Germany that the Ottoman Empire did not 
deserve to be an ally of Germany-an Ottoman alliance would put burden mainly on 
Germany, so it would be a big mistake to accept the Ottomans as allies.158 His main 
concern was to secure all possible economic concessions for Germany. He reported to 
the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg on May 12, 1914 that: 
…The (German) military mission is not an end in itself, but only an 
expedient for our Baghdad Railway policy. Because of that it is 
indispensable that the activity of the military mission be subordinated to 
our political interests.159 
 
In reply Bethmann-Hollweg stated that: 
…We are only interested in the success of the reform work if, and for as 
long as, Turkey remains on our side. If we fail to keep Turkish support, 
any increased battle-worthiness of their army would merely be a gain for 
our enemies. We have no reason to sharpen the Turkish sabre for France 
or Russia…160 
 
Emperor Wilhelm II was equally pessimistic about the possibility of losing the 
Ottomans to the Entente side: 
It is absolutely nothing compared with earlier! Turkey no longer intends to 
stick with us. She is trailing in the Russo-French wake, where money is 
thrown about, and is feeding us solely with words… We cannot! (keep 
Turkey on our side) because we have no money! They are no longer on 
our side! 
…While she amuses us with phrases and fine-sounding words and a few 
Turkish princes, she is joining Russia and the Triple Entente for anti-
Greek aims. We are in fact sharpening Turkish weapons for them.161 
 
Wilhelm II was worried about Ottoman-Greek relations. In April 1914, the 
negotiations between the Ottomans and Greece started in the island of Corfu as a 
result of a German initiative. The Emperor’s dynastic ties with the king of Greece and 
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his long-standing phil-hellenic tendencies forced him to open negotiations between 
the two countries.162 The Ottomans wanted to secure at least some of the Aegean 
islands lost during the Balkan wars and conclude an alliance with Greece if possible. 
Finally, in June 1914 the negotiators did manage to agree on some points, but the 
outbreak of the First World War prevented the agreement from being realized. 
Wilhelm II continued to disparage the Ottomans in the last months before the 
outbreak of war: 
The dishonesty and hollowness of the Turks expressed itself in that they 
even wanted to buy cruisers immediately from us now to use against 
Athens! I will no longer stand for it. If the Turks want to make war on the 
Greeks over the islands, I will withdraw the officer mission!.. Turkey is 
beyond help, and of no further value! She may as well go to pieces in the 
arms of the Triple Entente!163 
 
Wilhelm II worried a good deal as a result of Cavid Bey's visits to France in 
search of loans, reports of secret meetings between Talat Paşa and the Russian 
Foreign Minister in May, and Cemal Paşa's meeting in June with the French Foreign 
Minister, both in search of an alliance.The Ottomans, however, were unable to secure 
an alliance with any of the Great Powers. Refused by England, Russia, and France, 
the Ottomans could either stay out of the trouble by concluding alliances with the 
small Balkan states or by accepting the partnership of one of the Great Powers. 
Remaining neutral or at least waiting for a year in case of a general war, and 
strengthening the army and the country, were accepted options by those Ottoman 
generals and politicians who had vision and common sense. 
By June 1914, the Ottoman Empire had in active army service 200,000 men 
and 8,000 officers. Although undergoing substantial revision and reform, it still was 
ill-equipped to fight a modern war. Transportation was a critical weakness. The 
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Baghdad railroad had two unfinished sections in the Taurus and Amanos mountain 
ranges in the southeast, which would hamper all efforts to bring soldiers and materials 
to Syria, Arabia, and Egypt.164 On April 7, 1914, Bronsart von Schellendorf 
completed the “Primary Campaign Plan for the Turkish Army”, but it was completed 
under the assumption that the Ottoman Empire would oppose an Eastern European 
coalition of Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia.165 When the Ottoman Empire in June 1914 
got the chance of becoming allied with some of the Balkan states, the plan had to be 
revised. 
The Von Sanders mission, comprised of thirty officers and forty men had 
considerable influence in the Ottoman army before July 1914. It was fully staffed, 
and several German officers held the commanding positions in some Ottoman 
infantry divisions.166 In May and June, the German cruisers, Goeben and Breslau paid 
visits to several Ottoman ports.167 Although not favoring an alliance, Germany was 
prepared for some sort of military engagement with the Ottomans in the 
preliminaries, which were leading to war. 
In many aspects Germany was right not to favor the Ottoman Empire as a 
military ally. It remained educationally backward, industrially underdeveloped, 
resource poor and financially bankrupt. Despite its physical landmass, strategic 
geographic position, and population base for the army, it would not add much to the 
powers of Germany.168 In addition, the Ottomans had no particularly deep 
commitment for an alliance with Germany. They preferred such an alliance only as a 
desperate measure in order to preserve the Empire intact. The Ottomans did trust 
                                                 
164 Erickson p.7-8. 
165 Erickson, p. 37. 
166 Erickson, p. 12. 
167 BOA, DH. KMS. Dosya: 22. Gömlek: 10, BOA, DH. KMS. Dosya: 2/1. Gömlek: 37, BOA, DH. 
KMS. Dosya: 23. Gömlek: 42. 
168 Erickson, p. 15. 
 71 
Germany more than any other Great Power because the Germans had not occupied 
any Ottoman territory and had no important economic involvement with the 
Capitulations. For the Turks “the fear of, and hostility to, Tsardom was foremost in 
deciding Turkey’s orientation (towards Germany), and the alliance of her former 
protectors (France and Great Britain) with Nicholas II was viewed as an ill omen”.169 
Except for Enver Paşa, there was not an unconditional commitment of any important 
Ottoman figure to the Germans before the war broke out. Enver Paşa’s presence as 
the most powerful and important figure in the Ottoman Empire was, however, an 
adequate reason for a potential alliance with Germany in case of a general European 
war. As he stated in a decree issued in January 1914, even though he was only a 
minister, he had the power to overrule any of the other ministers on any occasion, 
thus showing the power and determination to make decisions on his own authority.170 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
FROM THE ALLIANCE TREATY TO THE  
DECLARATION OF HOLY WAR 
 
 
A. Developments Until The Arrival of The Goeben And Breslau 
 
Ernest Jackh, in his study, The Rising Crescent, published many of the telegrams 
exchanged between Berlin and its emissaries in Istanbul during the month that 
preceded conclusion of the Ottoman-German alliance, between July 14 and August 5, 
1914. These telegrams show how Germany's attitude toward an Ottoman alliance 
changed substantially during just twenty days. They also give many hints about the 
situation in Istanbul, and how the Ottoman government responded to the emerging 
threat of war in Europe. 
What we lack for the most part are the Ottoman sources. The few that have 
come to us consist of memoirs left by the leading generals and cabinet members 
which, while useful, consist only of what their authors wanted us to know about their 
thoughts and actions. Since real power in the Ottoman government was in the hands 
of Enver and Talat, they did not exchange views with the Ottoman ambassador in 
Berlin, Mahmut Muhtar Pasa, nor was there any sort of formal decision-making 
process including other members of the cabinet. There are some letters surviving 
from Cemil Bey, Ottoman military attaché in Berlin, written to colleagues and friends 
in Istanbul, which shed some light on Istanbul's supreme ignorance about affairs and 
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interests in Europe at the time, but that is about it. The Ottoman diplomatic archives 
suriving from this period have yet to be made available or explored. 
Just at the time that Franz Ferdinand, Heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, 
was assassinated in Sarajevo, in June, 1914, the Ottomans were attempting to secure 
alliances to avoid a general European War with minimum damage or even with some 
gains for the Empire. The Entente Powers, however, rejected all Ottoman attempts for 
an alliance, and among the Balkan states only Bulgaria was willing to join in such an 
alliance with the Ottomans. It was the subsequent Austro-Hungarian declaration of 
war against Serbia on July 28, 1914, with German consent, which changed the 
German attitude toward an alliance with the Ottomans. 
The German ambassador to the Porte, Wangenheim, was the most 
influential factor, which took the Ottoman Empire into the Triple Alliance that had 
been formed many years before by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. 
Wangenheim was a keen observer of affairs in the Ottoman Empire at the time, and 
his reports to Berlin reflected reality. He did not react, however, whenever the 
German government did not accept his views or act on them. On July 14, he shared 
the view of von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister that “Turkey could be regarded 
only as passive factor for next few years because of her unfavorable army situation, 
and Turkey, in her present situation could assume no other position than that of 
swinging like a pendulum between powers, eventually joining the stronger and more 
successful group”.171 On July18, in answering von Jagow, Wangenheim opposed the 
ideas of the Austrian ambassador to the Porte, Pallavicini on the grounds that it was 
needless “to induce Turkey to join Austria through Bulgaria”. He added that: 
“Without doubt, Turkey today is totally incapable of carrying an alliance…For the 
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present, Turkey can only be advised to remain aloof from any political adventure and 
maintain good relations with all countries.”172 
It is difficult to know whether or not the Ottoman politicians were aware of 
the Ottoman uselessness as an ally.173 The Turkish historian, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, 
who himself served in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry soon after the war, claims for 
the most part that Enver and Talat, who were the real decision-makers in the Ottoman 
government just before the start of the war, were incapable of knowing or properly 
analysing events.174 In his telegram to von Jagow on July 22, Wangenheim stated that 
Enver Paşa shared his view about the Ottoman Empire being a useless ally, 
concluding that it should remain aloof from political adventures. Enver Paşa added 
“in practice, however, Turkey’s difficulty is that she can only reorganize with 
international calm and thoroughness if she is protected externally from attack. For 
this, she needs support of one of groups of great powers.”175  
This telegram was in fact an Ottoman offer of alliance with Germany. Enver 
Paşa tried to apply leverage by adding that there were sympathizers with the Entente 
in the cabinet, and that if Germany refused his offer, it would be hard to suppress 
them. Wangenheim stated that: “Enver Pasha could therefore say that present Turkish 
government urgently desires to join Triple Alliance, and only if she were rejected by 
us would she decide, with a heavy heart, in favor of pact with Triple Entente.”176 In 
his July 23 telegram to von Jagow, Wangenheim stated that: “Finally, the Grand 
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Vizier repeated the desire expressed to me yesterday by Enver Pasha- Turkey desires 
her formal entry into Triple Alliance to be made possible…The Grand Vizier 
answered that Turkey demands exclusive protection against Russia on part of Triple 
Alliance, but not against France and England.”177 
A week before the conclusion of the Ottoman-German alliance, Enver Paşa 
and Said Halim Paşa made offers of alliance to Germany. Enver Paşa’s claim that the 
cabinet favored Germany as the first possible option of an ally, however, hardly 
seems to be true. When the Ottomans and Wangenheim negotiated about the treaty, 
the only cabinet members who were present were Enver, Talat and Said Halim, and 
Halil Bey.178 They did not inform any other cabinet members or military men about 
the alliance until  the treaty was concluded. 
On July 24, 1914, Germany changed its position about rejecting the 
Ottoman Empire as an ally. The German Foreign Office did not alter its feeling that 
the Ottomans would not be a suitable ally, nor did Wangenheim, but on the same day 
that the Austrian ultimatum was delivered to Serbia, Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered that 
such an alliance be concluded.179 The Personal Minister of Kaiser, Wedel wrote to the 
Foreign Office that: 
His Majesty the King and Kaiser considers Freiherr von Wangenheim’s 
statements theoretically correct, but is of opinion that at present moment 
Turkey’s inclination toward Triple Alliance must be taken advantage on 
grounds of opportunism. 
Therefore, if Stamboul definitely wishes to conclude alliance “under 
sponsorship of Triple Alliance or by one of powers of same”, then she 
should certainly attempt to bring Rumania and Bulgaria together, and 
place herself at Austria’s disposal. Wangenheim should use his influence 
toward this end in Constantinople.”180 
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Since the Ottoman Empire had been rejected as an ally by the other Powers, 
once it decided that it could not stay out of the war and had to take one side or the 
other, it was destined to choose to join the German alliance. On July 27, Wangenheim 
reported to Jagow that: “even if Turkey is not absolutely assured of protection against 
Russia on our part, Turkey still is not lost to Triple Entente.”181 Even if the Serbian-
Austrian conflict would not turn into a European war, Germany would prefer to keep 
Turkey under control. It was advantageous for Germany, therefore, to keep the 
Ottomans in its orbit, and it could pretend that it was an ally that trusted the Turks’ 
military power. Von Sanders convinced Wangenheim quickly that the Ottoman 
Empire could serve as a useful capable ally: “I must naturally readjust my opinion on 
whether Turkey is capable of fulfilling an alliance. General Liman told me today that 
he takes full responsibility to defeat any opponent under any conditions as long as he 
is in command of the five Turkish army corps which can be put immediately into the 
field.”182 
The next day Wangenheim informed von Jagow by telegram that the 
Ottoman Grand Vizier had secretly proposed an alliance agreement of five articles, 
which became the basis of the Treaty of August 2, 1914.183 Both sides recognized the 
need for secrecy. Wangenheim stated that: “The negotiations should be carried out in 
strict secrecy, even as regards Turkish ministers. Grand Vizier requested me not to 
say anything about this at present to any of my colleagues, labeling it as 
‘indispensable’, so much so that even Mahmud Muktar Pasha should not be 
informed.”184 The German Foreign Office did not even want Pallavicini to be 
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included in the negotiations. On the Ottoman side, however, something different was 
going on. Said Halim, Enver, and Talat were trying to act on their own in this matter, 
without consulting or getting the opinions of other members of the Cabinet. Whereas 
the German ambassador was fully authorized about the negotiations, the Ottomans 
did not even inform their ambassador in Berlin, Mahmud Muhtar Paşa about what 
was going on. Said Halim, Enver, Talat and Halil were thus fully responsible for the 
signing of the treaty that would drag Turkey into the war a few months later. 
After a few days of negotiations between the two governments, on July 31, 
1914 German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg fully authorized Wangenheim to sign 
the treaty.185 The next day, Wangenheim advised German Foreign Office that: “in 
case the Goeben (German battleship) should not be absolutely needed in 
Mediterranean, then she would well be in position, strengthened by Turkish fleet, to 
keep Russian Black Sea Fleet in check, assure cable connections with Rumania, and 
prevent a Russian landing on Bulgarian coast.”186 Once the alliance was concluded, 
therefore, it was almost certain that the Ottoman Empire would be involved in the 
World War on the side of Germany.  
Wangenheim reported to von Jagow on August 2, 1914 that Grand Vizier 
Said Halim Paşa and Wangenheim signed the Treaty of Alliance between Germany 
and Turkey at four p.m. on that day: 
 
 
Constantinople, August 2, 1914 
 
1. Both contracting parties pledge to preserve strict neutrality in regard to 
the present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 
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2. If Russia should intervene with active military measures, and should 
thus bring about a casus foederis for Germany with relation to Austria-
Hungary, this casus foederis would likewise enter into effect for Turkey. 
3. In case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at the disposal 
of Turkey. The latter, for her part, assures the said military mission an 
effective influence on the general conduct of the army, in accordance with 
the understanding arrived at directly between His Excellency the Minister 
of War and His Excellency the Chief of the Military Mission. 
4. Germany obligates herself, if necessary, by force of arms to protect 
Ottoman territory in case it should be threatened.  
5. This agreement, which has been concluded for the purpose of protecting 
both Empires from international complications, which may result from the 
present conflict, goes into force as soon as it is signed by the above-
mentioned plenipotentiaries, and shall remain valid, together with any 
similar mutual agreements, until December 31, 1918 
6. If this treaty is not given notice of cancellation by one of high 
contracting parties six months before expiration of term mentioned above, 
it remains in effect for a further period of five years. 
7. This present document shall be ratified by His Majesty the German 
Emperor, King of Prussia, and by His Majesty the Emperor of the 
Ottomans, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within a period of one 
month from the date of its signing. 
8. The present treaty shall remain secret and can only be made public by 
one of the high contracting parties only after an agreement by both said 
parties. 
 
FREIHERR VON WANGENHEIM 
 
SAID HALIM187 
 
As Erickson states, “in reality, the Secret Treaty of Alliance was a very weak 
document with no operative power of enforcement and it was written only for the 
situational context of the ongoing Balkan crisis of July 1914”.188 Nevertheless, when 
some of the cabinet members such as Cavid Bey heard about it and objected to its 
                                                 
187 Jackh, pp. 20-21. For the German and Turkish versions of the treaty, and the original treaty in 
French see Appendix 3. Yılmaz, pp. 248-250, Aydemir, p. 510. 
188 Erickson, p. 25. Trumpener shares this view by stating that: “ Reflecting the delays occasioned by 
Berlin’s hesitant attitude, some sections of the treaty text were obsolete at the moment it was signed… 
It was a hastily made agreement rather than the logical culmination of carefully laid German plans.” 
Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, (New York: Caravan Books, 
1989), p. 17.  
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provisions, Said Halim Paşa prepared additional articles, which included the real 
Ottoman concerns. Germany accepted these articles a few days later.189  
Basically, the alliance was concluded primarily to prepare a common 
defense against Russia.190 For the Ottomans, however, it meant considerably more 
than this, which is why Said Halim Paşa added the additional clauses. The main 
Ottoman concerns, which were added, involved the abolition of the capitulations, the 
retake of Aegean islands, reaching an agreement with the Bulgarians, preservation of 
the Ottoman territorial integrity, the Muslims in Russia and war indemnity.191 It is 
logical to accept Erickson’s view that “in the absence of a clear foreign policy or 
coherent military war plans, these six proposals probably come as close to defining 
Turkey’s war aims prior to hostilities than any other documents.”192 
On the day the treaty was signed, the Ottomans declared general 
mobilization and armed neutrality. The Grand Vizier also got the Sultan to dissolve 
the Ottoman Parliament193 thus blocking all the opposition to the treaty. However, the 
treaty really needed a revision as it was signed after the German declaration of war on 
Russia. 
                                                 
189 Said Halim’s proposals were accepted by Wangenheim on August 6, but there are not adequate 
sources in German archives as to whether they were officially ratified. The proposals were: 
1.Germany promises its help in the abolition of the capitulations. 2.Germany agrees to lend its support 
to understandings with Rumania and Bulgaria, and it will see to it that Turkey secures a fair agreement 
with Bulgaria with reference to possible spoils of war. 3. Germany will not conclude peace unless all 
Turkish territories, which may be occupied by its enemies in the course of the war, are evacuated. 4. 
Should Greece enter the war and be defeated by Turkey, Germany will see to it that the Aegean 
islands are returned to the Turks. 5. Germany will secure for Turkey a small correction of her eastern 
border, which shall place Turkey into direct contact with the Muslims of Russia. 6. Germany will see 
to it that Turkey receives an appropriate war indemnity. Erickson, p. 27 
190 “In fact, German war aims ranged from irresponsible Pan-Germanism - which treated the Ottoman 
Empire as a German vassal, a prospective ‘German Egypt,’ a stepping stone to British Egypt and 
India- to the authentic policy of the German Foreign Office, which ranged from a belief in ‘spheres of 
influence’ to a wholehearted determination to grant full independence to a loyal and valuable ally.” 
Jackh, p. 139. 
191 Jackh witnessed in 1915 the Ottoman leaders saying to him that they desired no additional 
territory. They were just assuming tremendous burdens solely to gain their national freedom, self-
determination, and independence. Jackh, p. 131. 
192 Erickson, p. 27. 
193 The group consisted of Enver Paşa (the War Minister), Talat Paşa (the Minister of Interior Affairs), 
Said Halim Paşa (the Grand Vizier), Halil Bey (the Chairman of the Parliament) and Cemal Paşa 
(Minister of Navy), who after learning the conclusion of the treaty took sides with the group. 
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The treaty had various problems, even at the time it was signed. Firstly, 
Article 1 was already out of date since Germany had already declared war on Russia. 
Article 2 was not clearly worded since the phrases “ to intervene with active military 
measures” and to “invoke casus foederis” could be interpreted in various ways.194 
Secondly, Article 3 provided “leverage for Germany over Turks” by stating that “in 
case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at the disposal of Turkey. The 
latter, for her part, assures the said military mission an effective influence on the 
general conduct of the army”.195 This article was worded finally after the meeting 
between Enver Paşa, Wangenheim and Sanders on August 1, 1914. In the German 
Embassy, they discussed “the military implications of the proposed German-Ottoman 
pact”196; and “they reached an agreement that Turkey would stand on the defensive 
on the Caucasian frontier and assemble an army of 210,000 men in Thrace for 
operations against Russia, but with Bulgarian and Rumanian neutrality uncertain, 
alternatively against Greece”.197 Wangenheim thus had created the grounds for 
Germany to force the Ottoman Empire to enter the war whenever it wanted by means 
of military pressure and control. 
                                                 
194 Erickson, p. 25. “It (the treaty) became activated only in the case of Russian intervention with 
active military measures against Austria-Hungary. In fact, Russia had only mobilized and had not 
intervened, when Germany declared war on her first. Therefore, when Germany declared war on 
Russia on August 1, 1914, the Secret Treaty of Alliance (which was signed the very next day) was in 
effect invalid on signature.” 
195 Erickson, p. 25. 
196 Ulrich, Trumpener, ‘Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol.1, Issue 4 (October, 1966), p. 182. The only known prewar plan for 
German-Ottoman action against the Entente was agreement of 1 August 1914 between Wangenheim, 
Liman and Enver who met in German Embassy. Agreed that once the alliance was signed, Ottoman 
army should take defensive position in Caucasus against Russia, concentrate most of their land forces 
in Thrace for offensive in occoperation with Bulgaria against Russia or Greece. At that point they did 
not know if Bulgaria would join the Central Powers or if Rumania would allow Turco-Bulgarian 
advance through its territory against Russia, so agreement had little meaning, except to show that 
Ottomans intended to participate in the German war effort. But Wangenheim knew it would take at 
least one month for Ottomans to assemble their forces in Thrace, but he felt that on basis of this 
agreement he was justified in signing the alliance on afternoon of 2 August. Trumpener, Germany and 
the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, p. 23. 
197 Erickson, p. 25. 
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Thirdly, Articles 4 and 5 were designed by taking Von Sanders mission’s 
presence into consideration. The duration of the treaty was accepted as five years, 
because the contracts of the Von Sanders mission would end around that time 
according to the agreement of 1913. However, the same agreement provided that 
Germany had the right to call back the mission in case of a war.198 Thus, the German 
military guarantee for Turkey was not sincere or strong. 
Finally, Articles 6, 7, and 8 were the least problematic ones. In his telegram 
of August 2, however, Wangenheim noted that the Turkish “Grand Vizier wishes 
explicit ratification of treaty by both sovereigns so that Turkey remains committed 
unconditionally, even if he perhaps should be overthrown”.199 This shows that Said 
Halim Paşa was aware of the fact that they were taking a risky, if not a dangerous 
step, for Turkey, which would well cause him to lose his position. The Ottoman 
Sultan ratified the treaty officially on October 17, 1914,200 even though it was over a 
month after it was signed. 
The analysis of the treaty shows that its wording was very ambiguous, and 
left the Ottoman government with very little maneuvering room to stay out of the war 
at the last minute. What made the Ottoman government to sign such a treaty? Did not 
they consider the possible results of such an engagement? Enver Paşa was an 
important factor in the decision to sign. He thought that he could raise an army of two 
million soldiers and, believing in a quick German victory in a general European war, 
he sought rejuvenation of the Ottoman Empire by military victories, which would be 
gained as a result of German partnership. Talat Paşa, as a politician, saw the German 
                                                 
198 Von Sanders and his officers wanted to return on August 19, 1914 by using this clause. Trumpener, 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, p. 33, Trumpener, ‘Liman von Sanders and the 
German-Ottoman Alliance’, p. 184 Liman was suspicious about Enver’s statements, he thought that 
Turkey would not intervene in the foreseeable future –certainly not until Russia had been beaten by 
the Central Powers. 
199 Jackh, p. 21. 
200 Cezmi Eraslan, ‘I. Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye’, Türkler (Cilt: 13), (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 
2002), p. 49. 
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alliance as the only means of assuring the Empire’s survival.201 He believed that the 
Ottoman Empire should take advantage of the German alliance in order to reconstruct 
the country. He was aware of the seriousness of the situation, but he did not want the 
Empire to miss the chance of allying with a great power.202 These views prevailed as 
Enver and Talat had the real power in the Ottoman government at the time. 
The Grand Vizier and the other ministers were either hesitant or opposed to 
the alliance. They could not oppose or get involved in the decisions, however, either 
because for fear of the CUP which supported Enver and Talat, or because the 
decision-makers had successfully hidden the entire procedure from them.  
The long term German and Ottoman expectations from the alliance differed 
considerably. A survey of the literature on the Ottoman-German partnership reveals 
that the expectations on both sides were considerably different. Whereas the 
Ottomans saw the alliance as an opportunity for survival, the Germans felt the 
alliance assured them of control of the Ottoman Empire as a satellite state that would 
ease their military campaigns and economic future. Before 1914, the main instrument 
for German economic aims was the Baghdad Railroad. In the summer of 1914, 
however, the Baghdad Railroad did not seem to offer a bright future. The Deutsche 
Bank, the main sponsor of the project, was on the verge of bankruptcy, and “the 
(Baghdad) line was neither capable of dominating economic life nor suitable 
instrument for exerting political pressure on the Porte”.203  
                                                 
201 Corrigan, p. 147. Talat said “Turkey was in the position of a man in a forest beset by robbers. He 
would willingly give up his clothes, his money, his goods and his chattels, if only his life and perhaps 
his shirt were saved”. 
202 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, (New York: Doubleday, Page& Company, 
1918), p. 34. Talat told Morgenthau that: “We understand that (turning Turkey into a colony like 
Egypt) is Germany’s programme. We also know that we cannot put this country on its feet with our 
own resources. We shall, therefore, take advantage of such technical and material assistance as the 
Germans can place at our disposal. We shall use Germany to help us reconstruct and defend the 
country until we are able to govern ourselves with our own strength. When that day comes, we can say 
good-bye to the Germans within twenty-four hours”. 
203 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, p. 8. 
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The diplomatic and political situation arising from the start of a world war 
closed the gap between Turkish and German interests. But the war plans which were 
put into effect and the expectations that were realized mostly matched those of 
Germany rather than the Ottomans. Von Jagow wired Wangenheim on August 3, 
1914 that secrecy of alliance was needed because of the German ship movements i.e. 
the movement of Goeben and Breslau, in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Von 
Jagow ordered Wangenheim to “see that Mohammedan catchword is spread in 
English colonies, particularly toward India; revolutionization of (Mohammedan) 
Caucasus is desired.”204 The plans of using the Goeben and Breslau in order to 
control the Russian fleet, and using the Islamic appeal of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph 
in order to stir up the Muslim populations of the Russian and British empires were the 
German plans accepted by the Ottomans before the war began.  
Wangenheim’s telegram to Von Jagow, on August 4, revealed that Enver 
Paşa had instructed the military authorities in the Dardanelles to permit German and 
Austrian warships to pass through as early as the fourth of August.205 This shows that 
Germany did not design a fait accompli for the entrance of the two ships on August 
10.206 Likewise, on the issue of the British requisition of the newly-completed 
Turkish ships, Sultan Osman and Reşadiye,207 about the same time, Trumpener claims 
that Enver and Talat Paşa hid the truth from the public, that “on August 1, Enver and 
Talat offered to direct the Sultan Osman to a German port, a proposal directly 
                                                 
204 Jackh, p. 21 see also, Tirpitz to Jagow in, Jackh, p. 22 
205 Jackh, p. 23 
206 Cemil Bey’s telegram on August 3, strengthens this view that he informed Turkey about German 
plans of permitting the two ships to go to the Black Sea in order to join the Ottoman fleet. ATASE, 
Dos. 243, Kls. 1009, fih. 7-2. 
207 These ships, of which Turkey paid sums amounting to seven million British pounds, were 
requisitioned by England on August 3, 1914. 
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accepted by Berlin”. He argues that this proposal, learnt by the English, might have 
made England to requisition the ships.208 
The telegrams by Von Jagow to the German ambassador to Sofia, dated 
August 4 and 5 revealed that an Ottoman attempt to secure an alliance with Bulgaria 
was initiated by Germany.209 After lengthy negotiations by Talat Paşa and Halil Bey 
with the Bulgarians from the sixth to nineteenth of August, a secret mutual defense 
pact was signed. Bulgaria, however, did not agree to collaborate with the Ottomans in 
war since Rumania had not yet officially declared its neutrality. The resulting 
Ottoman-Bulgarian treaty was thus no more than a non-aggression pact in which both 
parties agreed not to attack any other Balkan state without consulting each other, and 
to avoid confrontation with Rumania.210 
In the meantime, after an adventurous escape from the British fleet, on 
August 10 Goeben and Breslau passed through the Dardanelles as a result of an order 
issued by Enver Paşa, though the Grand Vizier opposed the passage due to 
uncertainty about Bulgarian and Rumanian involvement in the war.211 On the issue of 
arrival of the ships, Gottlieb argued that without the cruisers the Ottomans would 
have delayed their entry into the war for some time, which might well have caused 
Russia to go ahead and occupy the Straits. “But just the expected downfall prompted 
London and Paris to seek a means of preventing Petrograd from achieving her aims.” 
He concluded that that was why Britain allowed the German ships to reach İstanbul, 
                                                 
208 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, pp. 23-24 “On the same day that Said 
Halim told Wangenheim he feared British would seize the Sultan Osman, the British did in fact seize 
both it and the Reshadiye without any Ottoman provocation. However in fact there was provocation, 
for on 1 August 1914, Enver and Talat had offered to send the Sultan Osman to a German North Sea 
port, and Germans had accepted the offer.” 
209 Jackh, p. 23. 
210 Erickson, p. 31, Trumpener, ‘Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman Alliance’, p. 185. 
211 See Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire: 1914-1918, pp. 25-37 for the details. 
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and once accomplished their task of arriving Turkey, the ships made it inevitable for 
Turkey to join Germany in war.212 
On the day the Goeben and Breslau entered the Sea of Marmara, Germany 
was already at war with England, France, and Russia. With the ships in İstanbul, 
Germany was certain about the Ottoman entry on its side.213 Berlin ordered Admiral 
Souchon, commander of Goeben, to open hostilities against Russia as soon as 
possible to force an immediate Ottoman entry into the war. In the face of Entente 
Powers’ protests about the German Mediterranean Fleet’s presence in İstanbul, on 
August 11, 1914, the Ottoman government acquired the Goeben and Breslau by 
means of a fictitious sale in order to avoid immediate entry into war, and to continue 
the Ottoman neutrality as long as possible.214  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
212 Gottlieb, p. 47. 
213 Morgenthau, p. 80. “With them (Goeben and Breslau) the Turkish navy became stronger than the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet and thus made it certain that Russia could make no attack on 
Constantinople… The passage of the Strait by these German ships made it inevitable that Turkey 
should join Germany at the moment that Germany desired her assistance, and that it likewise sealed 
the doom of the Turkish Empire.” 
214 Halil Menteşe, pp. 189-191. 
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B. German-Ottoman War Aims and the Ottoman Empire’s Entry Into the First 
World War 
 
The point of no return for the Ottoman Empire started with the arrival of the German 
ships in İstanbul. In the meantime, the war went on with pace in the European theater, 
and the Germans were increasingly insistent that the Ottomans openly live up to their 
treaty obligations and enter the war. According to the German war plans, the Ottoman 
Empire had to achieve the following goals. “The Ottomans would be used mainly to 
serve the German interests of diverting the Russians and British from the main war 
theaters of Europe. The Ottomans therefore were to advance into Egypt and to invade 
the Caucasus, with an appeal for a Holy War enhancing their efforts in these 
campaigns as well as undermining the enemy’s ability to mobilize its forces” from the 
Muslim populated colonies.215 Furthermore, Turkish participation in the war could 
impress and intimidate the Balkan states to join the Triple Alliance.216 However, most 
members of the Ottoman cabinet did not want to enter the war unless Bulgaria and 
Rumania openly joined the Central Powers.217 
According to the Ottoman point of view, the war was an opportunity to 
preserve possession of the Straits and Eastern Anatolian territories, to bring an end to 
the continuous loss of territories which had been taking place since the 18th century, 
to regain control of Arabia and Egypt, to unite the Turks of Persia, Caucasia, 
Azerbaijan and Afghanistan under the Ottoman flag, and to continue the leadership of 
                                                 
215 Shaw, pp. 313-314, Eraslan, p. 343. 
216 Cemil Bey to Enver Paşa, ATASE, Dos. 243, Kls. 1009 in Yılmaz, p. 74. 
217 Gottlieb, pp. 35-37. 
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the Empire in the Muslim world.218 Gottlieb states, “Turkey was expected not only to 
defend the Straits and protect her frontiers but conquer Egypt, free Persia, prepare the 
creation of independent states in Trans-Caucasia, threaten India from Afghanistan and 
furnish active assistance in European theaters.”219 
At the end of August 1914 a new group of German military personnel came 
to the Ottoman Empire as a result of a request made earlier by Enver Paşa. This 
second group consisting of 460 men was headed by German coastal specialist 
Admiral Usedom who was assigned by Enver Paşa as Commander of the Straits 
Fortifications.220 Its arrival had been delayed because of objections by Rumanian 
President Bratianu, who closed the Rumanian borders against shipments of military 
personnel and materials.221 
As the Ottomans could not secure Rumanian and Bulgarian collaboration in 
war activities, at the start of September 1914, the Ottoman General Staff -despite 
Enver Paşa's pressure- still was hesitant about entering the war since they felt it 
would be very difficult to get the proposed German military help through those 
countries. Another concern of the Ottoman General Staff was the issue of 
mobilization, which had been declared the same day that the treaty with Germany 
was signed. Although, they had initially expected to complete the mobilization in 
twenty or twenty-five days, by the end of August they understood that it would not 
be finished until the end of September.222 They therefore recommended that unless 
the issues of Bulgarian collaboration, mobilization and supply of military materials 
                                                 
218 İsmet Görgülü, On Yıllık Harbin Kadrosu (1912-1922): Balkan- Birinci Dünya ve İstiklal Harbi, 
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220 With Usedom officially in charge of all Ottoman coastal defenses, German coastal specialists begin 
repair of Dardanelles defenses at the beginning of September. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman 
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by Germany were achieved, the Empire should not enter the war until the spring of 
1915. 223 Most of the ministers in the cabinet and some Turkish ambassadors in 
Europe shared this view. The Turkish ambassador in London, Tevfik Paşa, wired 
Talat Paşa on August 29, of rumors within political circles in London that Germany’s 
fate would not be good at all, and it would be defeated by Russia.224 The Ottoman 
ambassador to France, Rıfat Paşa also warned the Turkish government on August 28 
that the Russian were in control of the road to Vienna, that Rumania and Italy would 
join the Entente powers, and concluded that the Ottoman Empire should stay neutral 
as Germany would inevitably be defeated.225 
According to the German war plans, the German army would defeat the 
French army in six weeks after the start of the war, and then after the French front 
was closed, it could turn to the eastern front to defeat Russia. Enver and Talat 
developed their plans for Ottoman participation in the war on the supposition that 
this German plan would be successful. But the French army stopped the Germans at 
the Battle of the Marne, which ended on August 9, 1914, making a quick German 
victory on the Western Front almost impossible and inaugurating years of trench 
warfare and stalemate.226 It was as a result of this defeat that Germany pushed the 
Ottomans into an immediate entry into the war, just as the suppositions, which were 
behind Enver and Talat's willingess to join melted away. The head of Prussian 
general staff, Moltke pushed von Sanders, and Wangenheim pushed Enver to open 
hostilities against Russia.227 
Enver Paşa was determined to enter the war as soon as possible, but the 
“failure to obtain Bulgaria’s assistance, the poor condition of the Dardanelles 
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defenses, and the lack of military preparedness”228 made the other cabinet members 
increase their opposition to entering the war at that time. “Wangenheim advised 
Berlin on September 8 that Enver’s hands are tied by unwillingness of colleagues and 
technical problems.”229 Besides Germany’s pressure, some of the Turkish 
newspapers, bribed by the Germans, tried to conceal the German defeat at the Marne 
from the Ottoman public in order to bring the Ottomans into the war before the 
public found about the real situation. They spread propaganda about German 
victories and Wilhelm II’s view of Ottoman greatness: “The Russian bogey, inflated 
beyond measure, was blamed for all the country’s ills” by these newspapers.230  
On September 6, 1914 the Turkish General Staff formally and significantly 
changed the Primary Campaign Plan for the Turkish army.231 The plan now required 
the Fourth Army to be sent to Egypt, and the Third Army to the Caucasus. The 
Ottoman General Staff232 and Liman von Sanders exchanged views on the possible 
Turkish offensives against the Triple Entente. According to the new plan, Turkey 
would open fronts in Syria, Egypt, and the Caucasus. Von Sanders proposed an 
offensive to Odessa. His proposal was not accepted, as it was too risky to launch an 
attack on Odessa. The concentration plans included the Turkish concentration of 
forces in Thrace, Caucasia, and Palestine.233 
In the meantime, the Turkish government announced a unilateral abolition 
of the long-hated Capitulations on September 9, 1914 that would be valid after 
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October 1, 1914.234 The German and Austrian ambassadors joined the ambassadors 
of the Entente powers in formal protest notes against this action, but told the 
Ottomans privately that they would not press the issue at that time.235 With the 
completion of the war plan and the incitement of the Entente powers by abolishing 
the Capitulations, the Ottoman Empire was at the brink of the war, only needing a 
final reason to openly join Germany and Austria. 
For those Turks who opposed immediate involvement in the war, there 
were enough reasons to avoid entry. Chances were slim for a steady flow of supplies 
from Germany because of the situation in Rumania. On September 11, Cemil Bey 
reported from Berlin that the German situation in France was unfavorable. The 
Germans did not expect immediate collaboration by Rumania and Bulgaria, and the 
military materials from the Krupp factory could not reach Istanbul for some time.236 
The cabinet therefore on September 14 rejected Enver Pasa's authorization for 
German Admiral Souchon, who now commanded the entire Ottoman Black Sea fleet 
as well as the Goeben and Breslau, to conduct fleet maneuvers in the Black Sea.237 
Admiral Souchon, more than any others, was the person responsible for 
forcing the Ottoman Empire to openly enter the war. After the Ottoman cabinet 
rejected Enver Paşa’s order for him to enter the Black Sea and lead naval maneuvers, 
he declared that he would act on his own even if he could not get official permission. 
As a result, on September 21, the cabinet provided the necessary authorization, three 
days later appointing him Vice Admiral. In this way, the Ottomans would have an 
excuse if Souchon attacked Russian ships, because as a German naval officer he 
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would only be responsible to Wilhelm II, but as an Ottoman admiral he would be 
responsible to the Sultan. “If an incident should occur, the Porte would declare that 
Souchon had overstepped his authority, that he had been forbidden to do anything 
against Russia”.238 
Despite efforts by most cabinet ministers including the Grand Vizier to 
prevent immediate Ottoman entry into the war,239 Enver Paşa eased the way to 
achieve the German aims. On September 26, after the British ships which had 
patrolled the Dardanelles entrance since the Goeben and Breslau had entered, 
stopped an Ottoman torpedo boat soon after it left Ottoman waters, he personally 
ordered that the Dardanelles closed to all ships.240 The Ottomans also began to lay 
mines at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Furthermore, “on October 1 the Ottoman 
customs duties, traditionally controlled by the powers through the Capitulations, 
were unilaterally increased by four percent”.241 Enver Paşa, “the war minister, was 
confident that the empire was militarily ready to intervene. In fact, the only difficulty 
was the lack of money, he had to be sure of Germany’s financial support once the 
Turks had started marching.”242 
Germany assured Enver Paşa that the money he had asked for would be 
sent, but not the German personnel and war materials because the Rumanian 
president Bratianu “notified the German minister in Bucharest on October 2 that he 
would permit no further shipments of materiel for Turkey to enter the country”.243 
Aware of this fact, opposition cabinet members continued to maintain their position 
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against the war. In the meantime, impatient Sanders tried to withdraw his military 
mission from Turkey, but he was ordered by his German superiors to remain in his 
post.244 
Enver Paşa and the Ottoman interventionists held a secret meeting with 
Wangenheim on October 11. Enver Paşa told Wangenheim that “Enver, Talat, Halil 
and Cemal agreed that their group in the committee were committed to war, that 
Souchon would be authorized to attack the Russians as soon as Berlin deposited two 
million Turkish liras, and they would induce the grand vizier to resign if he refused 
to agree to German intervention”.245 Wangenheim promised Enver Paşa that the 
money would be delivered if war was declared, “and arrival of the gold (money) on 
October 21 cleared the way for action”.246 The same day Enver Paşa took the title of 
“vice-generalissimo (or deputy-commander in chief)”.247 
The next day, the German imperial headquarters received Enver Paşa’s 
final war plan. The plan required that “the opening blow was to be delivered by a 
surprise attack on the Russian fleet” in the Black Sea. “Furthermore, Enver’s plan 
provided for defensive land operations in Transcaucasia and the advance of an 
expeditionary corps against Egypt, while the bulk of the Ottoman army was to stand 
by for action against Russia’s southern flank.”248 The German Supreme Army 
Commander, Falkenhayn who replaced Moltke after the Marne defeat accepted the 
plan. On October 25, Enver Paşa drafted the authorization to Souchon, which 
“explicitly called for Black Sea maneuvers with the entire fleet and an attack on the 
                                                 
244 Trumpener, pp. 43-45 German intelligence said there was a three way split in Ottoman cabinet. 
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Russian fleet if a suitable opportunity presented itself”.249 Similarly, “Cemal issued a 
secret directive to senior officers of the Ottoman fleet that Admiral Souchon was 
entitled to receive their compliance with orders”.250 The other members of the 
Cabinet were unaware of these developments. 
Within the Turkish General Staff many –like Bronsart and Hafız Hakkı 
Paşa who were sent to Berlin on October 24 in order to learn the detailed opinions of 
the German headquarters about the war plan- thought that the best course of action 
was to wait out the developments. Enver Paşa, however, did not share this view.251 
He left the rest of the issue about starting a war to Souchon who would be the main 
actor for assault on Russian ports.252 
On October 29, the Ottoman fleet headed by Admiral Souchon shelled 
many Russian ports in the vicinity of Odessa and sunk some Russian vessels. 
Erickson argues that “the naval mission had no viable strategic objective.” The 
Ottoman fleet could only sink one warship, two gunboats and five merchant vessels. 
This shows that it was not a serious naval operation but a political provocation.253 
The raid angered the anti-interventionist members of the cabinet as it meant 
Ottoman involvement in war. “When the news of Souchon’s raid reached the Porte, 
Said Halim and Djavid demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities. According 
to the plan, Enver obliged by sending not only an order to that effect, but also a hint 
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directing Souchon to disregard the same.”254 However, the anti-interventionists were 
not persuaded, and they asked for a cabinet meeting. 
The next day the cabinet met, and four ministers resigned, as they did not 
wish to be involved in a government, which was responsible for war.255 Enver 
persuaded Said Halim Paşa to remain at his post by promising that he would send 
conciliatory notes to the Entente powers, especially to Russia. Pallavicini and 
Wangenheim also worked to persuade the Grand Vizier not to resign. Said Halim 
Paşa therefore agreed to remain, but Russia did not accept Turkey's excusatory 
note.256 “On November 2, 1914 Russia replied with a war declaration on the Ottoman 
Empire. Britain and France followed three days later.”257 On November 11, the 
Ottoman government declared war against Russia, France and Great Britain, and the 
same day Sultan Mehmed Reşad V, and the şeyhülislam declared Holy War against 
the Entente Powers.258 In his speech calling the parliament back into session, the 
Sultan summarized the official legitimization of the Ottoman entry into war stating 
that the Russian hostilities compelled the Ottomans enter into the war.259 
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CONCLUSION: 
 
The Ottoman Empire chose to become involved in the First World War on the side of 
the Central Powers. On both sides, it was not a carefully planned, clearly defined, 
and wholeheartedly believed decision. Although Germany and the Ottoman Empire 
had close ties for more than forty years, the history of the relations between the two 
countries did not influence their decision much to conclude an alliance in the final 
stage. Instead it was the diplomatic improvisation of Germany led by Kaiser Wilhelm 
II in July 1914 and the individual decisions of Enver, Talat and later Cemal, which 
made the German-Ottoman alliance possible. “Faced with the likelihood of a general 
European war, Germany’s leaders in late July 1914 abruptly set aside their 
misgivings about a close association with the decrepit Ottoman state and accepted 
the proffered military help of the Turks.”260 The Turks, whose fate was in the hands 
of Enver Paşa and his close colleagues, thought that the Central Powers would be 
victorious in a general European war. The Ottoman leaders thought that it was 
impossible to stay out of war, and that joining the Central Powers would help them 
reconstruct the Empire. 
I have tried to analyze the course of the Ottoman-German military and 
diplomatic relations before the First World War and to see whether the Ottoman-
German alliance was the inevitable outcome of the close economic, military and 
diplomatic relations which had been developed during the previous quarter century. 
It is difficult to conclude that the alliance was as inevitable as has been depicted 
since the Ottomans made several attempts to secure alliances with France, Great 
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Britain and Russia, all of which were rejected. The Ottomans, however, did have 
reasons to prefer Germany once they decided that they needed a big brother in order 
to survive. There were common concerns and coincidents of interests between 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire, as well as increased rivalries between Germany 
and the Entente Powers before the First World War.261 One cannot claim, therefore, 
that the Ottomans could have avoided the war by only analyzing the last three 
months before their entry into the war. 
This study concludes that several factors influenced the course of relations 
between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The Russian threat, the Baghdad 
Railroad Project, the German military reform missions and the German ambassadors 
in the Ottoman Empire, the friendship between Wilhelm II and Abdulhamid II, and 
the Young Turk sympathy in the military circles for the German militarism were the 
factors shaping the German-Ottoman partnership. However, actually, both countries’ 
own state interests, and theirs ways and choices of conducting foreign policy defined 
the degree of the partnership between the two states. Most of the Turkish sources 
emphasize one or few of the factors, and try to depict the Ottoman Empire’s entry 
into war as an eventual result of those factors. Historians like Gottlieb, Earle, 
Trumpener and Weber focus on the separate parts of the picture. Foreigner or 
Turkish alike, the historians tend to evaluate the period after the signing of the treaty 
of alliance as the continuation of the previous periods. This thesis tries to cover a 
broader picture of the relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire and 
concludes that the German-Ottoman relations had different characteristics before and 
after their treaty of alliance. Before the alliance the Ottoman Empire tried to ally 
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Germany in order to help survive the Empire whereas Germany tried to maximize its 
economic dominance and benefits in the Ottoman Empire without an actual 
commitment for an alliance. After the alliance the Ottoman Empire, while continuing 
its previous goal turned out to be a German ally, served for the ambitious and 
adventurous goals of Enver Paşa and his colleagues. Germany, on the other side, still 
not fully committed, agreed to ally the Ottoman Empire for its political and military 
needs.  
The Russian threat and the Baghdad Railroad Project were the two 
important factors, which led to a diplomatic rapprochement between Germany and 
the Ottoman Empire. Russia had been the Ottomans’ most dangerous enemy since 
the early years of the eighteenth century. Prussia had helped the Ottoman Empire 
considerably during that century since it felt that a powerful Russia on its eastern 
border would threaten its security. The Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78 made it 
clear that Russia would try its best to dissolve the Ottoman Empire and to occupy the 
Straits and Eastern Anatolia. At the Congress of Berlin, as a result largely of 
Bismarck's initiatives and arbitration, the Great Powers changed the clauses of the 
Russian-imposed Treaty of San Stefano (Ayastefanos), which could have hastened 
Ottoman dissolution. Bismarck had tried hard, nonetheless, to keep Germany on 
good terms with Russia throughout the years that he served as Chancellor. 
Bismarck's resignation from in 1890 opened the way for Wilhelm II to apply an 
aggressive foreign policy called Weltpolitik, according to which Germany challenged 
the other Great Powers by entering the race of colonization as the primary means of 
becoming a world power. Wilhelm II's failure to renew Bismarck’s non-aggression 
pact with Russia in 1890 was a clear sign that Bismarck’s cautious policy had been 
abandoned. Germany therefore joined the Ottomans in considering Russia as a 
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potential enemy. Bismarck had managed to avoid having both France and Russia 
hostile to Germany at the same time. It was Germany's reaction to Russia’s alliance 
with Britain and France that caused it to enter a defensive alliance against Russia 
with the Ottomans, who thought that the Russian threat would be eliminated with a 
German victory. 
By establishing close ties with Abdulhamid II, Wilhelm II secured 
permission to construct the Baghdad Railroad, which opened Ottoman dominions to 
German economic penetration. This was a real threat to Russian ambitions in 
Anatolia as well as to French and British interests in Iraq. Abdulhamid II and 
Wilhelm II, two real autocrats, appeared to the other Great Powers as real friends. 
Abdulhamid II tried to use German economic penetration as a means of balancing the 
economic domination of France and Britain in the Ottoman Empire as well as to 
establish security in his dominions.  Abdulhamid II attracted more reactions from the 
Great Powers when he convinced Wilhelm II to send a Military Reform Mission to 
Istanbul. His grandfather, Mahmud II (1808-1839) had brought the first Prussian 
officers to the Empire. Among them, von Moltke had made a major impact on the 
new Ottoman army created during the Tanzimat. During Abdulhamid II's reign Von 
der Goltz made an even bigger impact. The young Ottoman officers who were 
trained by these German officers admired the Prussian militarism characterized in the 
personality of Wilhelm II. The latter tried to use the German Military Support 
Missions to deepen German economic penetration into the Ottoman Empire. He 
supplemented this work by visiting the Ottoman Empire twice, in 1889 and 1898, 
appealing to the Ottomans, and through them to all Muslims, to demonstrate that he 
was the real protector of the Muslims and Islam. 
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Wilhelm II and Abdulhamid II created friendship between the two 
countries, which was basically fictitious since they were really acting entirely for the 
interests of their respective countries. Abdulhamid II was trying to end his Empire’s 
diplomatic isolation and to use the German card as leverage against France, Britain 
and Russia. Wilhelm II was trying to make the Ottoman Empire favor Germany 
politically and militarily in order to achieve its economic interests in the Ottoman 
territories.  
The Ottomans tried to turn to Britain, France and Russia after the 
Revolution of 1908. But since they were rejected by France and Britain and 
threatened by Russia, they continued Abdulhamid's policy of promoting German 
railroad projects and economic investments as a means of securing German 
protection and support. It was for this reason as much as anything else that the 
Young Turk leaders welcomed the German Military Reform Mission headed by Von 
der Goltz in 1909. Germany also helped the Ottoman Empire financially with a state 
loan of 30,000,000 francs in 1910, after Britain and France refused to provide the 
same amount of money, a clear diplomatic victory for the Germans. As a result, the 
Ottoman leaders began to believe that the Germans were their most likely protectors. 
German help was not so much the product of admiration and friendship as it was the 
simple result of Wilhelm II's policy of Reelpolitik, which required keeping on good 
terms with the Ottomans without actually making a commitment in the form of an 
alliance. The year 1910 was the peak of German-Ottoman rapprochement before 
August 1914, when the Treaty of Alliance was finally signed.  
The Revolution of 1908 was the product of Young Turks who were mostly 
organized under the umbrella of the CUP. Enver Paşa, one of the heroes of the 1908 
Young Turk revolution, was the product of the military schools, which had been 
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reformed by the Germans during the late nineteenth century. In the same way, 
Mahmut Şevket Paşa and Ahmet İzzet Paşa, both of whom served as Chief-of-Staff 
during this time, were heavily influenced by German militarism. Like Wilhelm II, the 
last generation of the Ottoman generals believed that the survival of the Empire 
depended on a strong army, which would be the guarantee of the Empire's economic 
and political independence as well as the deterrent to internal and external threats to 
the Empire.  
Faced with diplomatic isolation during the Tripolitanian War of 1911-1912, 
and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, when the Powers refused to live up to their treaty 
obligations to protect Ottoman integrity against Italian aggression, intervening only 
to accept and preserve Ottoman territorial losses, the Ottoman leaders at first did not 
turn to Germany due to the German failure to support the Ottomans at the time that 
Austria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1909. Instead, to avoid 
becoming a tool of German interests, they tried to secure the alliance of all other 
states, including even the Balkan states that had attacked them. Contrary to the 
claims of Turkish historians following establishment of the Turkish Republic, Enver, 
Talat and Cemal were not the tools of German interests. The Ottoman military's 
involvement in politics as the guarantor and dominator of Turkish politics prevailed 
in the Empire after the Raid on the Porte, but this was not the outcome of the leaders’ 
commitment to Germany. Mahmut Şevket Paşa and Enver Paşa admired German 
militarism, but their main concern was to establish authority and strengthen the 
Ottoman army rather than turning the Empire into a satellite state of Germany. 
From the end of 1910 to the beginning of 1914, the Ottoman leaders did not 
feel that Germany was a protector that could be trusted. They were aware that 
Germany would not guarantee Ottoman territorial integrity in case of a partition, but 
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would rather try to share the spoils. Indeed, the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars, 
and the resulting substantial territorial losses, proved to the Germans that it would be 
very difficult to prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the efforts of 
the German ambassadors in İstanbul, Marschall and Wangenheim, who urged Berlin 
to save the Ottoman Empire in order to benefit Germany, Germany merely sought 
military and economic dominance in the Empire without going to the trouble of 
protecting its integrity. 
The work of these able and influential ambassadors ultimately enabled 
Germany to become the least dangerous Great Power in the eyes of the Ottoman 
leaders, despite the fact that behind the scenes Germany was still involved in secret 
negotiations regarding partititon of the Empire, which demonstrated that in Germany 
there was not harmony between the thoughts of Wilhelm II, ambassadors and the 
German Foreign Office. After Abdulhamid's single-handed formulation and 
execution of Ottoman foreign policy, subsequent Ottoman leaders were unable to 
formulate a consistent foreign policy because of the many changes in the cabinets, 
which took place after 1908. The CUP leaders were not experienced enough to 
handle foreign affairs, but nonetheless they were forced to do so. The German-
Ottoman Treaty of Alliance of August 2, 1914 can be evaluated as the result of the 
inconsistent policies of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire. As Erickson argues 
in “Ordered to Die”: 
The Young Turks did not orchestrate foreign policy through a 
professionally staffed foreign ministry or foreign office, preferring instead 
diplomacy personally conducted by inner circle cabinet members. The 
period July through September 1914 was characterized by a series of 
Ottoman diplomatic initiatives which appear contradictory and confused. 
It is arguable that because of the Young Turks’ propensity to conduct 
diplomacy in isolation, that any given time between August and 
November 1914, no single individual within the Turkish government 
(including Said Halim and Enver Paşa) had a global awareness of the 
entire diplomatic situation affecting the Empire. This 
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compartmentalization of awareness destroyed any chance of rational 
checks and balances which might have prevented the war.262 
 
The lack of rational checks and balances on the Ottoman side was the most 
important reason why the Ottomans could not avoid entering the war. Until the last 
moment, Enver and Talat hid their decision to get into the war from the other cabinet 
members. The secret alliance of August 2, 1914 and the passage of Goeben and 
Breslau into Ottoman waters “provided the engine that separated Turkey from 
meaningful dialogue with the entente, while at the same time obligated Turkey to 
support Germany in an almost unavoidable slide toward war.”263 It would not have 
been easy for Germany to drag the Ottoman Empire into the war if it had a 
government that knew more about the situation in Europe at the time and was not 
subject to the personal decisions and dictations of Enver and Talat. It is necessary to 
add that the efforts of Admiral Souchon as well as of Ambassador Wangenheim only 
accelerated Turkey's entry into the First World War.264 
Last but not least, the German mission headed by Liman von Sanders 
helped significantly in the reorganization of the Ottoman Army, but it was far from 
orienting the Ottomans towards a commitment as an ally. It, like the previous 
German missions, was seen rather as the extension of German economic investments 
in the Ottoman Empire, but nothing more. The German missions were successful at 
providing substantial profits to the German weapons industry by getting the 
Ottomans to purchase most of their arms and ammunition from the great German 
companies like Krupp and Mauser. Like von Moltke and von der Goltz, von Sanders 
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assessed the value of Ottoman military power realistically, and concluded that the 
Ottoman Empire lacked the strength to supply the force needed from a real ally. The 
memoirs of Ali İhsan Sabis and Kazım Karabekir who held important positions in the 
Ottoman Army before and during the First World War reveal that the Ottomans did 
not sincerely regard the missions as useful for the Empire. In addition to the reforms 
they applied to the Ottoman Army, the missions mostly served to introduce German 
discipline and punctuality to the Ottomans. The young officers who were trained in 
German ways acquired the German militarist approach and later served as the core 
cadres of the Ottoman general staff during the First World War and the Turkish War 
for Independence. The presence of the von Sanders mission in the Ottoman Empire 
served as a deterrent factor against the Entente powers before the war, but it was far 
from being an effective tool to drag the Ottomans into the war. Germany never 
considered the German missions as the indispensable tools for persuading the Turks 
to agree on an alliance. After signature of the secret treaty of Alliance and the arrival 
of the Goeben and Breslau, however, Germany tried to use the German officers as 
leverage against the Turks and the Entente Powers.265  
To sum up, German-Ottoman diplomatic relations were mostly cordial 
following the first interaction at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The 
Ottoman-German Defensive Alliance of 1790, the arrival of the Kaehler Reform 
Mission in Turkey in 1883, the Baghdad Railroad Concession of 1904, Germany's 
supply of a state loan to Turkey in 1910, and the arrival of the von Sanders Military 
Mission in December 1913 were the peak points in developing relations between the 
two states. Although there was a regression in their relations in the first months of 
1914, the secret treaty of August 2, 1914, which was designed as a defensive treaty 
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against Russia, culminated in Ottoman involvement in the First World War as a 
partner of Germany.  
It is difficult to argue that Germany and the Ottoman Empire were involved 
in a close partnership after the early eighteenth century. Throughout the whole 
period, the two countries followed policies best fitted to their interests. Germany 
sought for economic and political domination in the Ottoman Empire, and the 
Ottoman Empire wanted to reform and reconstruct its army and economy in order to 
survive. In the last two centuries of its existence, the Ottoman Empire lacked the 
presence of a professionally staffed foreign office, which could dominate its conduct 
in foreign affairs. Instead, the individual acts and decisions of the Ottoman 
politicians and sultans shaped its relations toward the Great Powers, including 
Germany. Germany, on the other side, was strongly motivated by its economic 
ventures in the Ottoman territories, but it also lacked a consistent policy towards the 
Ottoman Empire. The biggest factor that caused the rapprochement of the two 
countries was their historical enemy, Russia. 
Contrary to the arguments in many secondary sources, thus, the German 
traditions in the Ottoman Army and the services of the German officers in the 
Ottoman Empire did not eventually lead to the alliance of Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire in the First World War. They were factors in the final decision, but not the 
major one. As Germany faced the belligerency between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, 
which led to the potential belligerency of Russia against Germany, Germany 
concluded an alliance with the Ottoman Empire. In the last three months before the 
Ottoman Empire's entry into the First World War, the willingness of Enver and Talat 
combined with the determination of Wangenheim and the aggression of Souchon 
prepared the end of the Ottoman Empire. 
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“Von der Goltz Paşa’nın 16 Teşrinevvel (Ekim) 1899 tarihinde Alman 
Genelkurmay Başkanı Waldersee’ye yazdığı raporun Yıldız Arşivi’ndeki Türkçe 
tercümesi”  Başbakanlık Arşivi, Yıldız Evrakı, Kıs: 15, Zarf: 74/81 
 
 
Bundan evvel takdim ettiğim tahrirata zeyl olmak üzere Avrupa-yi 
Osmani’nin ahval-i tedafüiyyesini hulasaten arz ederim. 
Avrupa-yi Osmani ber vech-i ati iki suretle müdafaa olunabilir. Evvela; 
Dersaadeti himaye içün tedabir-i lazime ittihazı ve saniyen; payitahtdan baid olan 
hudud hatları üzerinde köyleri muhafaza içün bazı merakiz-i tedafüiyyesinin teşkil ve 
ihzarı; Meriç vadisi ne Priştine ve Üsküp ve ne de Selanik’den müdafaa olunabilir. 
Devlet-i aliyye Avusturya ve Macaristan askerinin memalik-i mezkureye 
tecavüzlerini men itmek kaziyyesini başka bir devlete tevdi itmeğe mecburdur. 
Mamafih Selanik ile Üsküp ve Avlonya beyninde mumted olan hat, Makedonya ve 
Arnavudluk ve Eski Sırbistan aleyhinde ehemmiyeti haizdir. Sırbistan ile Bulgaristan 
aleyhinde icra olunacak harekat-ı askeriyyeninistinadgahı Üsküb ve daha doğrusu 
Kumanova’dır. “Müezzi?” ovasını müdafaa içün bundan mühim bir nokta olamaz. 
Devlet-i aliyye Yunanistan’dan çok korkmalıdır. Zira Yunanlılar denizi istila iderler 
ise Osmanlılar’ı sevahil-i garbiyede her nevi harekat icrasından men edebilirler. İşbu 
tehlike-i hakikiyeden uzun uzadıya bahs itmeksizin şurasını beyan etmeliyim ki, 
Osmanlı donanması külliyen kıymetden aridir. Boğaziçi ile Kale-i Sultaniye’den 
Dersaadet’e muvasalatı men içün inşa olunan istihkamat gayri kafidir. İstihkamat-ı 
mezkure bir düşman donamasına yirmi dört saat bile mukavemet idemez. İstihkamat-
ı ... tamir olunmadıkları gibi teçhizatı dahi noksandır. Karaya gelince; Dersaadet 
civarları Karasu ile tayin olunan Çatalca hattı ile himaye edilmektedir. Çatalca 
mevkii bir taraftan Marmara denizinde vaki Küçükçekmece körfezi ve diğer taraftan 
Terkos köyü üzerine istinad etmektedir. Beyker (Baker) ve Blum Paşalar tarafından 
tahkim edilmiş olan hatt-ı mezkur elyevm metruk bir haldedir. 
İmdi elyevm icrası lazım gelen şeyler bunlardır: Evvela; Dersaadet’in deniz 
cihetini torpidolar ve tahtelbahir, edavat-ı harbiyye ile müdafaa itmek, saniyen; 
Kavakların iki sahilinde, biri Rumili ve diğeri Anadolu cihetlerinde olmak üzere 
kubbeler ve cesim toplar ile mücehhez bazı (tabyeler) inşa eylemek, Fenar Boğazı 
içün denize doğru bazı bataryalar inşası dahi lazımedendir. Kale-i Sultaniye’de 
küçük bir filonun içtima’ı ve bu filoya erzak ve mühimmat yetişdirilmesi içün 
Büyükdere küçük körfezinin gözedilmesi icab-ı haldendir. Kavak geçidi bunun içün 
intihab idilebilir. Bunali (?) ve ? tafya ve iskele ve Magore (?) Sultaniye kalesi nam 
mahallerde inşaat-ı hazıra yerine, usul-ü cedide üzere istihkamlar inşası ehemdir. 
Kara ciheti içün bundan evvel takdim ettiğim tahrirata istinad ederim. Tahrirat-ı 
mezkure bizzat keşf ve muayene eylediğim bilcümle tefsilat-ı mükemmeliyeye 
havidir. 
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Almanya’ya i’zam olunacak Osmanlı zabitanı haşmetlu imparator 
hazretlerine bağayet sadık görünen zevattan mı, yoksa efkarımıza iştirake meyl ve 
her hususda bize muavenete hazır olan zabitan meyanında intihab idilecektir. Bu 
babda taraf-ı acizaname talimat irsalini rica iderim. 
Beyan-ı hal, ibraz-ı measir-i ihtiramkariye vesile ittihaz olundu. 
Fi, 16 Teşrinevvel sene 89 
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Appendix II 
 
D: 3          C: 1           İ. S.: 2 
Meclis-i Umumi Zabıt Ceridesi 
1. İnikad                                    1 Mayıs 1330 (1914)   Küşat Saati: 15.15 
1. Celse               Bedi Müzakerat               
Reis: Reis-i sin Rıza Paşa 
       
 
...Devletimizin şimdiye kadar mahrum olduğu menabii varidattan istifade 
edebilmesi için bazı düvel-i muazzama ile müzakerata girişilmiş ve Fransız 
Hükümeti ile hitam bulan bu müzakeratın İngiltere Hükümeti ile ikmali kuvve-i 
karibeye geldiği gibi, Almanya ve Rusya Hükümetleri ile de pek yakın bir zamanda 
hüsn-ü neticeye iktiranı kaviyyen memul bulunmuştur. Bu itilafların bir taraftan 
gelecek seneden itibaren bütçemizi tevzin ve diğer taraftan Devletimizle düvel-i saire 
arasındaki münasebat-ı siyasiyye ve iktisadiyyeyi takviye ve tahkim ederek 
memleketimizin sulh ve sükun dairesinde terakki ve inbisatı iktisadisini temine 
medar olacağını ümit ederim. 
Siyaset-i hariciyyemiz, hukukumuzun tamamen muhafazasıyla hukuk-u gayra 
riayetkar olmak esasına müstenit bulunmak itibariyle, Düvel-i Muazzama-i 
mütehabbe ile münasebat-ı siyasiyyemiz kemakan samimi, her taraftan mütekabilen 
ibraz olunan meaşir-i itilaf ve müsalemetperverane ile daha ziyade müstaiddi inkişaf 
ve inbisattır. Hal-i harp hitam bulmak hasebiyle, komşu devletlerle münasebat-ı 
siyasiyyemiz iade olunmuştur... 
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Appendix III 
İTTİFAK MUAHEDESİ 
 
İstanbul-Tarabya 
2 Ağustos 1914 
 
1. Tarafeyn-i akideyn, Avusturya-Macaristan ile Sırbistan arasında tahassüs eden 
ihtilaf-ı hazıra karşı kati bitaraflık muhafazasını deruhde eder. 
2. Rusya, Avusturya-Macaristan aleyhine fiili tedabir-i askeriyye ve müdahale ederek 
böylece Almanya’nın da harbe duhulünü mecburi kılarsa bu husus Osmanlı 
Devleti’nin de harbe iştiraki için sebep teşkil edecektir. 
3. Hal-i harbde Almanya, heyet-i ıslahiyesini Osmanlı Devleti emrinde ibka 
edecektir. Buna mukabil Osmanlı Devleti de bu heyet-i ıslahiyeye, harbiye nazırı 
hazretleriyle heyet-i ıslahiye reisi hazretleri arasında doğrudan takarrür edecek 
esasata tevfikan ordunun sevk ve idaresi hususundafiili bir nüfuz itasını temin eder. 
4. Tehdide maruz olacak Osmanlı topraklarını, Almanya lüzumunda silahla müdafaa 
eylemeyi taahhüd eder. 
5. Her iki devleti ihtilafat-ı hazıradan tevellüt edebilecek ihtilata karşı siyanet 
maksadıyla akdedilmiş olan itilaf zirde ismleri muharrer murahhaslar tarafından 
imzası akabinde meri olacak ve mütekabil mümasile ile 31 Kanunuevvel 1918 
tarihine kadar hükmü devam edecektir. 
6. Balada tespit edilmiş olan tarihten altı ay evvel tarafeyn-i akideyn tarafından bir 
ihbar vaki olmadığı takdirde muahedenin ahkamı yeniden beş sene daha meri 
olacaktır. 
7. Bu muahede haşmetlu Almanya İmparatorluğu ve Pruya kralı hazretleriyle 
Osmanlı  İmparatoru hazretleri tarafından tasdik edilecek ve müsaddak nüshalar 
tarih-i imzadan bir ay zarfında teati olunacaktır. 
8. Bu muahede gizli tutulacak ve ancak tarafeyn-i aliyeyn-i akideynin arasında 
bilitiraf neşredilecektir…Tasdiken 
 
Baron von Wangenheim                                                         Sait Halim 
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Deutsch-Türkischer Bündnisvertrag 
 
Konstantinopel, 2. August 1914 
 
 
• Die beiden vertragschließenden Teile verpflichten sich, gegenüber 
dem gegenwärtigen Konflikt zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Serbien strikte 
Neutralität zu bewahren. 
• Falls Rußland mit aktiven militärischen Maßnahmen eingreifen und 
dadurch für Deutschland den casus foederis gegenüber Österreich-Ungarn 
herbeiführen sollte, so würde dieser casus foederis ebenfalls für die Türkei in Kraft 
treten. 
•  Im Kriegsfalle wird Deutschland seine Militärmission zur Verfügung 
der Türkei lassen. Die Türkei ihrerseits sichert der genannten Militärmission, 
entsprechend den zwischen Sr. Exz. dem Kriegsminister und Sr. Exz. dem Chef der 
Militärmission unmittelbar getroffenen Vereinbarungen, einen wirksamen Einfluß 
auf die allgemeine Armeeführung zu.  
• Deutschland verpflichtet sich, das Gebiet des Ottomanischen Reiches 
im Falle der Bedrohung nötigenfalls mit den Waffen zu verteidigen. 
•  Dieses Abkommen ist getroffen, um die beiden Reiche vor den 
internationalen Verwicklungen zu schützen, die aus dem gegenwärtigen Konflikt 
entstehen könnten; es tritt in Kraft, sobald es durch die erwähnten Bevollmächtigten 
unterzeichnet ist, und bleibt nebst den gegenwärtigen ähnlichen Verpflichtungen bis 
zum 31. Dezember 1918 in Gültigkeit. 
•  Falls dieser Vertrag nicht durch einen der hohen vertragschließenden 
Teile sechs Monate vor Ablauf des hier oben genannten Termins gekündigt wird, 
bleibt er für einen weiteren Zeitraum von fünf Jahren in Kraft. 
•  Die vorliegende Urkunde wird durch S. M. den Deutschen Kaiser, 
König von Preußen, und S. M. den Kaiser der Ottomanen ratifiziert, und die 
Ratifikationen werden binnen eines Monats nach dem Datum der Unterzeichnung 
ausgetauscht. 
•  Der gegenwärtige Vertrag bleibt geheim und kann erst nach einem 
zwischen den beiden hohen vertragschließenden Teilen getroffenen Übereinkommen 
veröffentlicht werden. 
 
Baron Wangenheim                                                    Said Halim 
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Appendix IV 
 
ATASE, Dosya: 73, Klasör: 1646, Fih.: 4 
 
 
Harbiye Nezareti Erkan-ı Umumiye Riyaseti 
 
29 Teşrinievvel 1330 
 
Son vaziyet-i siyasiyyeye göre “harb planı” hakkında bazı mütalaat 
 
VAZİYET-İ SİYASİYYE: 
Müttefikler: Almanya, Avusturya, Bulgaristan 
Düşmanlar: Rusya, İngiltere, Fransa, Yunan, Sırb 
 
Bulgaristanın Sırbistana ilan-ı harbi ile beraber Yunan Bulgara ilan-ı harb edecek ve 
bittabi biz de Yunana ilan-ı harb edeceğiz. Bunu müteakip İngiltere, Rusya, Fransa 
bizlere ilan-ı harb edecekler. Bu vaziyet de dolayısıyla ordunun vezaifi: 
1. Bulgaristana yardım etmek 
2. Boğazları ve İstanbulu karadan ve denizden müdafaa  
3. Bunların ifasından akdem umumi harbin iyi netice etmesine mümkün mertebe 
müessir bir suretde yardım etmek 
4. Umumi harbde Alman ve Avusturyaya yardım 
 
1. Bulgaristana Yardım Etmek 
Harb-i umuminin neticesine balkan harbi çok az tesir yapar. Bulgara yardım 
Bulgar ordusunun Sırb ve Yunan ordularına galibiyetini tesir edecek bir harda 
olmalıdır. 
Bu tarafa ne kadar az kuvvet gönderirsek netice-i katiyye cihetinde o kadar 
kuvvet bulundurabiliriz. Sırb ordusu Avusturyalılarla meşguldur. Bulgarların taaruzu 
ile beraber Avusturyalılar da taarruza kalkışabilirler. O halde Sırblar Bulgarlara karşı 
100,000 kişi bile gönderemez. 
Yunan ordusunda yeni silahlar ve toplar çok ise de zabitan mikdarının 
azlığına dair mütemadiyen gelen haberlere göre Yunan, tekmil redif ve 
müstahfızlarla beraber 200,000 den fazla ordu çıkaramaz. Ceman 300,000 e varamaz. 
Bu iki müttefik ordusuna karşı beherinin mevcudu 35,000 den aşağı olmayan on 
Bulgar fırkası (mevcudu 350,000 nefer) yalnız mutavaffık olur. Biz de iki kolordu 
verirsek (ceman 80,000 bin neferdir), o halde Bulgarlar düşmanlarına karşı hepsi 
syyar ve muvazzaf olmak üzere 430,000 neferle hareket etmiş olurlar ki 140,000 
nefer bir tevfik vardır. İşbu 430,000 kişilik kuvvetin 180,000 neferlik beher fırkası 
Sırba ve müteyakısı Yunana dönerek muzafferiyetli bir harb yapabilir. Bizim bu 
cihetle ikinci kolordudan başka altıncı kolorduyu vermemiz münasib olur. Çünkü 
nisbeten daha iyi iktidarda olan diğer kolordularımız daha kuvvetli düşman olan 
müttefiklere karşı lazımdır. 
 
2. Boğazları ve İstanbulu Karadan ve Denizden Müdafaa 
Düşman donanmalarından Rus donanmasını bizim donanmamızın mahv 
etmesi ümid olunur. Her halde donanma kumandanından bu hususdaki muvaffakıyet 
derecesi sorulmak lazımdır. İngiliz ve Fransız donanmalarının Çanakkale Boğazını 
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zorlaması cihetiyle gelince bu ya karaya asker çıkarmak ve denizden zorlamak yahud 
yalnız denizden zorlamak suretleriyle olur. 
Düşman donanmalarının boğaz istihkamatını tamamen mahv ve tahrib edip 
edemiyeceğini boğaz kumandanlığından ve sevahil istihkamatı müfettişliğinden 
sorulmalıdır. Boğazın ağzındaki ........... izledikten sonra boğazın içine giren asıl 
büyük istihkamlarımızı tahribe mani olmak için Almanyadan birkaç ağır obüs 
bataryası getirtmeğe çalışmak ve boğazın içine serseri torpil vaz’ etmek pek faideli 
olur. 
İşbu boğaz istihkamatının arkasına karaya asker çıkarmak suretiyle de boğaz 
istihkamatını düşürmeğe çalışabilirler. Her ne kadar Yunanlar Osmanlı-Bulgar 
ordularıyla, Fransa Alman ordularıyla paymal olurken ve İngiltere Mısırda tahrib 
edilirken boğazın arkasını alabilecek ihtimali bir kuvvet tefrik etmeleri müşkil ise de 
İstanbulun zabt-ı İslam üzerine ve Devlet-i Aliyyenin Rusyaya taaruz ilanına tesir-i 
azim yapacağı her hal muhtemel bir harekettir. 
İngiliz donanmasının İstanbul önüne gelmesi Devlet-i Aliyyeyi harbten 
alıkoyamazsa da oradan taarruzu gayri mümkün ve Kafkasyaya taarruzu müşkil kılar. 
Her halde Çanakkalenin müdafaası son derece mühim bir meseledir. 
Düşmanlarımızın burada çıkaracağı kuvvetin azami bu müşkil ahval içinde 
40,000 den fazla olamayacağından seyyar jandarmalarla beraber üçüncü kolordu bu 
mikdara takviye edilirse hem Çanakkale ....... edilmiş hem de düşmanın küçük 
kuvvetlerle İzmire ve ........... sevahiline yapacağı taarruzlara karşı şiddetli hareket 
edilmek imkanı istihsal edilmiş olur. 
 
3. Harb-i Umuminin İyi Neticelenmesine Müessir Bir Surette Yardım Etmek (Yani 
Almanya ve Avusturyaya Yardım Etmek) 
Fransa cihetine bir yardım yapamayız, binaenaleyh bizim uğraşacağımız düşman 
ikidir: İngiltere ve Rusya 
A. İngiltereye Karşı: 
a. Mısıra Taarruz: Sekizinci kolorduyla Mısıra taarruz. Sekizinci kolordunun 
Süveyş istikametine karşı tehşidi beray-ı ......... İngilizlere vakit bırakmamak için 
sekizinci kolorduyu şimdiden Kudüs ve şimalinden tehşide başlamak lazımdır. 
İngilterenin Mısırı takviye ederek harbi uzatması haline karşı İngiltere için en 
mühim bir nakit olan bu cihetde harbi tahaddi etdirmek için onikinci kolordunun da 
bu cihete tahsis edilmesi lazımdır. 
Bu cihetle Arabandan ve Hicaz fırkasından da istifade olunabilir. 
b. İrana taarruz: Hind kolordusuyla Araban ve İmam Hüseyin hazretleri İran 
üzerine taarruz etmelidir. 
c. Basra Körfezi cihetine taarruz: Ebussuud Hazretleri Araban ile Basra 
fırkası ile Kuveyt ve .........ye ve bu cihetle İngiliz nüfuzuna tabi menatıka taarruz 
olunur. 
d. Bağdad ve havalisi kumandanının toplayabildiği bütüm asakir 
kuvvetleriyle İranda İngiliz orduları aleyhine bir cihad açılır. 
e. Harbi neticelendirmek için İngilizlerin inadını kırabilmek: Bu harbde maddeten en 
az zarar gören İngilizlerdir. Fransız, Rus, Alman ve Avusturyalılardan yüz binlerce 
ölürken İngilizlerden ancak beş-on bin ölüyor. Ticareten de en az İngilizler zarardide 
oluyor. Binaenaleyh harbin tahaddisinde inad etmek en ziyade İngilizler için kabil ve 
faidelidir... 
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Appendix V 
Başkomutan Vekili ve            Tuğg.                           Enver Paşa 
Harbiye Nazırı 
 
Başkomutan Vekili  Yzb.   Kazım (Orbay) 
Yaveri 
 
Genelkurmay Birinci  Tuğg.   Bronzart von Schellendorf 
Başkanı 
 
Genelkurmay Birinci  Alb.   Hafız Hakkı 
Başkan Yardımcısı 
 
Genelkurmay Birinci  Alb.   Bahattin 
Başkan Yardımcısı 
 
Harekat Şubesi Müdürü Yrb.   Von Kress 
 
Harekat Şubesi  Bnb.   İhsan (Sabis) 
Müdür Yardımcısı 
 
Harekat Şubesi  Bnb.   İsmet (İnönü) 
Müdür Yardımcısı 
 
İstihbarat Şubesi  Bnb.   Kazım (Karabekir) 
Müdürü 
 
İstihbarat Şubesi  Bnb.   Seyfi (Düzgören) 
Müdürü 
 
İstihbarat Şubesi  Bnb.   Ömer Lütfi 
Müdür Yardımcısı 
 
Demiryolu ve Muvasala Bnb.   Patrich 
Şube Müdürü 
 
Demiryolu ve Muvasala Bnb.   Refik 
Şube Müdür Yardımcısı 
 
Demiryolu ve Muvasala Yzb.   Mümtaz 
Şube Müdür Yardımcısı 
Menzil Umum   Yrb.   Nihat 
Müfettişliği 
 
Sıhhiye Umum  Alb.   Dr. Süleyman Numan 
Müfettişliği 
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Appendix VI 
29 TEŞRİNİEVVEL 1330 (11 KASIM 1914) HARB HALİ 
BEYANNAME-İ RESMİSİ 
 
 
Şehr-i halin onaltıncı günü donanmay-i humayunun bir kısmı tarafından Karadenizde 
manevra icra edilmekte olduğu sırada Karadeniz Boğazına torpil dökmek vazifesiyle 
hareket ettiği bilahire anlaşılan Rusya donanmasının bir takımı mezkur manevraları 
ihlal ve müteakıben izhar-ı muhasema ile Boğaza doğru hareket etmeleriyle 
donanmay-ı humayun tarafından mukabele olunmakla beraber şayan-ı teessüf olan şu 
hadise hakkında hükümet-i seniyyece Rusya devletine müracaatla tahkikat icrası ve 
vakıa esbabının zahire ihracı teklif ve bu suretle bitaraflığı muhafazaya ihtimam 
edilmiş olduğu halde Rusya devleti müracaat-ı vakıaya cevap vermeksizin sefirini 
geriye celp ettiği gibi kuvay-ı askeriyyesi de Erzurum hududunu hatt-ı muhtelifeden 
tecavüz etmiş ve bu sırada Fransa ve İngiltere devletleri dahi sefirlerini geriye 
çağırdıktan başka İngiliz ve Fransız donanmaları müştereken Çanakkaleye ve İngiliz 
kruvazörleri Akabeye top atmak sureti ile bilfiil muhasemata ibtidar ve ahiren de 
düvel-i mezkureye Devlet-i Osmaniyyece müstainen bittevfikat-ı Allah-u teala 
mezkur üç devlete hal-i harp ilanını irade eyledim. 
 
22 Zilhicce 1332/ 29 Teşrinievvel 1330 
 
 
 
Dahiliye Nazırı ve Maliye Nazırı Vekili 
Talat 
 
Harbiye Nazırı                        Şeyhülislam ve Evkaf Nazırı                 Nafia Nazırı 
      Enver          Hayri                                             * 
 
Maarif Nazırı ve Posta                  Bahriye Nazırı                   Adliye Nazırı ve Şuray-ı 
  T. T. Nazırı Vekili                                Cemal                                Devlet Reis Vekili 
         Şükrü                                                                                                     İbrahim 
 
Ticaret ve Ziraat Nazırı 
                                                       Ahmet Nesimi 
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29 TEŞRİNİEVVEL 1330 (11 KASIM 1914) TARİHLİ 
CİHAD-I EKBER HATT-I HUMAYUNU 
 
ORDUMA, DONANMAMA 
 
Düvel-i muazzama arasında harb ilan edilmesi üzerine her daim nagihani ve haksız 
tecavüzlere uğrayan devlet ve memleketimizin hukuk ve mevcudiyetini fırsatçı 
düşmanlara karşı icabında müdafaa edebilmek üzere sizleri silah altına çağırmıştım. 
Bu suretle müsellah bir bitaraflık içinde yaşamakta iken Karadeniz Boğazına torpil 
koymak üzere yola çıkan Rus donanması talimla meşgul olan donanmamızın bir 
kısmı üzerine ansızın ateş açtı. Hukuk-u beynelmilele muğayir olan bu haksız 
tecavüzün Rusya tarafından tashihine intizar olunurken gerek mezkur devlet ve gerek 
müttefikleri İngiltere, Fransa devletleri sefirlerini geri çağırmak suretiyle 
devletimizle münasebat-ı siyasiyyelerini katlettiler. Müteakıben Rusya askeri 
hududumuza tecavüz etti. Fransa ve İngiltere donanmaları müştereken Çanakkale 
Boğazına İngiliz gemileri Akabeye top attılar. Böyle yekdiğerini takip eden hainane 
düşmanlık asarı üzerine öteden beri arzu ettiğimiz sulhu terk ederek Almanya ve 
Avusturya-Macar devletleriyle müttefikan menafi-i meşruamızı müdafaa için silaha 
sarılmaya mecbur olduk. Rusya devleti üç asırdan beri devlet-i aliyyemizi mülken 
pek çok zararlara uğratmış şevket ve kuvve-i milliyyemizi artıracak intibah ve 
teceddüt asarını harble ve bin türlü desayis ile her defasında mahva çalışmıştır. 
Rusya, İngiltere ve Fransa devletleri zalimane bir idare altında inlettikleri 
milyonlarca ehl-i İslamın diyanete ve kalben merbut oldukları hilafet-i 
muazzamamıza karşı hiç bir vakit su-i fikr beslemekten fariğ olmamıştır ve bize 
müteveccih olan her musibet ve felakete müsebbib ve muharrik bulunmuşlardır. İşte 
bu defa tevessül ettiğimiz Cihad-ı Ekber ile bir taraftan şan-ı hilafetimize diğer 
taraftan hukuk-i saltanatımıza karşı ika edilegelmekte olan taaruzlara inşaallahuteala 
ilelebed nihayet vereceğiz. Avn-i inayet-i bari ve meded-i ruhani-i Peygamberi ile 
donanmamızın Karadenizde ve cesur askerlerimin Çanakkale ile Akabe ve Kafkas 
hududunda düşmanlarımıza vurdukları ilk darbeler hak yolundaki gazamızın zaferle 
tetevvüc edeceği hakkındaki kanaatimizi tezyid eylemiştir. Bugün düşmanlarımızın 
memleket ve ordularının müttefiklerimizin pay-i celadeti altında ezilmekte 
bulunması bu kanaatimizi teyid eden ahvaldendir. 
Kahraman askerlerim, 
Din-i münibiniz vatan-ı azizimize kasteden düşmanlara açtığımız bu gaza va cihad 
yolunda bir an evvel azm ü sebattan ve fedakarlıktan ayrılmayınız. Düşmana aslanlar 
gibi savlet ediniz. Zira hem devletimizin hem fetva-i şerife ile davet ettiğim üç yüz 
milyon ehl-i İslamın hayat ve bekası sizlerin muzafferiyetinize bağlıdır.Mescitlerde, 
camilerde, Kabetullahta huzur-u Rabb-ı alemine kemal-i vecdi istiğrak ile 
müteveccih üç yüz milyon masum ve mazlum mümin kalbinin dua ve temenniyatı 
sizinle beraberdir. 
Asker evlatlarım, 
Bugün uhdenize terettüp eden vazife şimdiye kadar dünyada hiç bir orduya nasib 
olmamıştır. Bu vazifeyi ifa ederken bir vakitler dünyayı titretmiş olan Osmanlı 
ordularının hayrülhalefleri olduğunuzu gösteriniz ki düşman-ı din ü devlet ile bir 
daha mukaddes topraklarımıza ayak atmaya, Kabetullahı ve merkad-i münevvere-i 
nevebiyi ihtiva eden arazi-i mübarekey-i Hicaziyyenin istirahatini ihlale cüret 
edemesin. Dinini, vatanını, namus-u askerisini silah ile müdafaa etmeyi padişah 
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uğrunda ölümü istihkar etmeyi bilir bir Osmanlı ordu ve donanması olduğunu 
düşmanlarımıza müessir bir surette gösteriniz. 
Hakk-ı adil bizde zulm-ü advan düşmanlarımızda olduğundan düşmanlarımızı 
kahretmek için cenab-ı adil-i mutlakın inayetli gurrası ve Peygamber-i zişanımızın 
inayet-i manevisi bize yar ve yaver olacağına şüphe yoktur. 
Bu cihaddan mazisinin zararlarını telafi etmiş şanlı ve kavi bir devlet olarak 
çıkacağımıza eminim. Bugünkü harple birlikte hareket ettiğimiz dünyanın en cesur 
ve muhteşem iki ordusu ile silah arkadaşlığı ettiğimizi unutmayınız. Şehitlerimiz 
şüheday-ı Salifeye müjde-i zafer götürsün. Sağ kalanlarınızın gazası mübarek, kılıcı 
keskin olsun. 
 
22 Zilhicce, 29 Teşrinievvel 1330 
Mehmet Reşad 
 
 
CİHAD-I MUKADDES FETVASI 
 
İslamlık aleyhine düşman hücumu vaki ve İslam memleketlerinin gasb ve yağma 
edilmesi ve İslam halkının esir edilmesi ortaya çıkınca İslam padişahı bütün halkı 
silah altına almak suretiyle Cihadı emrettikte “Enfiru” ayeti hükmünce bütün 
Müslümanlar üzerine cihad farz olup genç ve ihtiyar piyade ve süvari olarak bütün 
Müslümanların mal ve canları ile Cihada baş vurmaları farz-ı ayn olur mu? El cevab: 
Olur. 
Bu suretle bugün İslam halifeliği makamına ve Osmanlı ülkesine harb gemileri ile ve 
kara kuvvetleri ile hücum etmek suretiyle İslam halifeliğine düşman ve Allah 
korusun Müslümanlığın yüksek ruhunu söndürmeye çalışmakta oldukları 
gerçekleşmiş olan Rusya, İngiltere ve Fransa ile onlara yardımcı ve destekçi olan 
hükümetlerin aleyhine harb ilan ederek ve harekete geçerek gazaya hemen 
başlamaları farz olur mu? El cevab: Olur. 
Bu suretle maksadın gerçekleşmesi bütün Müslümanların Cihada baş vurmalarına 
bağlı iken Allah korusun karşı koysalar bu davranışları büyük günah ve isyan olup 
Allah gazabına ve bu ağır günahın cezasına müstahak olurlar mı? El cevab: Olurlar. 
Bu surette İslam hükümeti ile muharebe eden adı geçen hükümetler İslam halkı 
öldürmüş ve bütün ailelerini mahv ile istemeyerek ve zorlanmış olsalar bile İslam 
hükümeti askeri ile muharebe etmeleri şer’an haram olup öldürülerek cehennem 
ateşini hak etmiş olurlar mı? El cevab: Olurlar. 
Bu suretle bugünkü günde İngiltere, Fransa, Rusya, Sırp, Karadağ hükümetleri ile 
bunları destekleyenlerin idareleri altında bulunan Müslümanların Osmanlı 
hükümetine yardımcı bulunan Almanya ve Avusturya aleyhine harb etmeleri İslam 
halifeliğinin zararını mucib olacağından büyük günah olmakla çok acı azabı hak 
etmiş olurlar mı? El cevab: Olurlar. 
 
Ketebetül fakiri ileyhüm teala 
Hayri bin Avni Elürgabi afa anhuma 
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Appendix VII 
D: 3          C: 1          İ. S.: 2 
 
Meclis-i Umumi Zabıt Ceridesi 
1. İnikad                                    1 Kanunuevvel 1330 (1914)   Pazartesi 
1. Celse               Bedi Müzakerat              Saat: 13.15 
Reis: Reis-i sin Rıza Paşa 
 
Hükümet-i Seniyyemiz ihtiyar ettiği müsellah bitaraflıkta sebatı azmetmiş 
iken, Donanma-i Humayunumuz Karadeniz’de Rus Donanması’nın tecavüzatına 
duçar olmuş ve müteakıben Rusya ve İngiltere ve Fransa Devletleri hudutlarımıza 
asker ve donanma sevk ile fiilen muhasemata başlamış oldukların, Avni Bari ve 
inayet-i Peygamberiye bittevessül düvel-i mezkureye karşı hal-i harbi ilan ile 
hudutlardaki ordularıma ileri hareket emri verdim. 
Muazzam müttefiklerimiz Almanya ve Avusturya-Macaristan Devleti’nin 
şanlı orduları tarafından müşterek düşmanlara karşı Avrupa’da ihraz olunan 
muzafferiyat-ı mütevaliye Kuvay-ı Berriye ve Bahriyemizin ve emr-i şeri ile Rusya, 
İngiltere ve Fransa’ya karşı cihada davet edilen mücahidiyn-i İslamın, Asya ve 
Afrika’da parlak zaferler ilave edeceğine ve bundan sonra Cenab-ı Hakkın 
muhafaza-i hak ve adl için silaha sarılmış olan Devlet-i Aliyyemize ve çar aktar-ı 
cihandaki İslamlara şeref ve saadetle mübeşşir bir istiklal bahşedeceğine mutekidim. 
Devletimizce vaktiyle ecanibe bahşolunan müsaadat-ı mahsusa, anenfeanen 
işgal ve makasidini tebdil ederek, hukuk-u hükümranimizi haleldar edici bir 
mahiyyet-i muzırra iktisap eylemiş olduğundan, hukuk-u beyneddüvel esasatından 
hiçbirine temas etmeyen ve kapitülasyon namı altında içtima eden bilcümle 
imtiyazat-ı ecnebiyyenin refini irade ederek, düvel-i sairede olduğu gibi, Memalik-i 
Şahanemde dahi ecanip ve bunlara müteallik muamelat hakkında hukuk-u 
beynelmilel ahkamının tatbiki usulunü vaz eyledim. 
Harb-i Umumiye iştirak etmeyen düvel-i muazzama ve hükümat-ı saire ve bilhassa 
komşumuz Bulgaristan ile münasebat-ı siyasiyyemizin kemakan halisane ve dostane 
olduğunu maal memnuniyye beyan ederim. 
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Appendix VIII 
Nezaret-i Umur-u Bahriye 
 
Birinci Daire 
 
Şube: 1571 
 
 
 
Donanmay-ı Humayun Birinci Komutanlığına tayin buyrulan Amiral Suşon cenapları 
tarafından Donanmay-ı Humayun talim için Karadenizde bulunduğu sırada vereceği 
her nevi emirlere harfiyen itaat edilmesini bu hususta katiyen tereddüt 
gösterilmeyerek emirler gereğinin her türlü haller ve şartlar dairesinde yapılmasını 
isterim. 
 
 
11 Teşrinievvel 1330 (24 Ekim 1914) 
 
Bahriye Nazırı Ahmet Cemal 
 
 
 
Akbay, p. 93 
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